# Cuba Oil Neg –

#### Needs –

#### A2 Refugee crisis

#### China not go to cuba

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#### A2 us hegemony

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## Oil Spills

### Oil Spills CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government.

#### President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill response in Cuban waters, effective immediately.

#### License US oil companies for spill related coordination and clean-up – CP solves the impact to any oil spill and does not loosen the embargo – that prevents a political backlash

Melissa Bert (a military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations) and Blake Clayton (fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations) 2012 “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill”, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515

The imminent drilling of Cuba's first offshore oil well raises the prospect of a large-scale oil spill in Cuban waters washing onto U.S. shores. Washington should anticipate this possibility by implementing policies that would help both countries' governments stem and clean up an oil spill effectively. These policies should ensure that both the U.S. government and the domestic oil industry are operationally and financially ready to deal with any spill that threatens U.S. waters. These policies should be as minimally disruptive as possible to the country's broader Cuba strategy.¶ The Problem¶ A Chinese-built semisubmersible oil rig leased by Repsol, a Spanish oil company, arrived in Cuban waters in January 2012 to drill Cuba's first exploratory offshore oil well. Early estimates suggest that Cuban offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial—somewhere between five billion and twenty billion barrels of oil and upward of eight billion cubic feet of natural gas. Although the United States typically welcomes greater volumes of crude oil coming from countries that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a surge in Cuban oil production would complicate the United States' decades-old effort to economically isolate the Castro regime.¶ Deepwater drilling off the Cuban coast also poses a threat to the United States. The exploratory well is seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The failed Macondo well that triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had broadly similar features, situated forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet below sea level. A spill off Florida's coast could ravage the state's $57 billion per year tourism industry.¶ Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.¶ Repsol has been forthcoming in disclosing its spill response plans to U.S. authorities and allowing them to inspect the drilling rig, but the Russian and Chinese companies that are already negotiating with Cuba to lease acreage might not be as cooperative. Had Repsol not volunteered to have the Cuba-bound drilling rig examined by the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to certify that it met international standards, Washington would have had little legal recourse.¶ The complexity of U.S.-Cuba relations since the 1962 trade embargo complicates even limited efforts to put in place a spill response plan. Under U.S. law and with few exceptions, American companies cannot assist the Cuban government or provide equipment to foreign companies operating in Cuban territory.¶ Shortfalls in U.S. federal regulations governing commercial liability for oil spills pose a further problem. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) does not protect U.S. citizens and property against damages stemming from a blown-out wellhead outside of U.S. territory. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, BP was liable despite being a foreign company because it was operating within the United States. Were any of the wells that Repsol drills to go haywire, the cost of funding a response would fall to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is woefully undercapitalized. OPA 90 limits the OSLTF from paying out more than $50 million in a fiscal year on oil removal costs, subject to a few exceptions, and requires congressional appropriation to pay out more than $150 million.¶ The Way Forward¶ As a first step, the United States should discuss contingency planning for a Cuban oil spill at the regular multiparty talks it holds with Mexico, the Bahamas, Cuba, and others per the Cartagena Convention. The Caribbean Island Oil Pollution Response and Cooperation Plan provides an operational framework under which the United States and Cuba can jointly develop systems for identifying and reporting an oil spill, implement a means of restricting the spread of oil, and identify resources to respond to a spill.¶ Washington should also instruct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct basic spill response coordination with its counterparts in Cuba. The United States already has operational agreements in place with Mexico, Canada, and several countries in the Caribbean that call for routine exercises, emergency response coordination, and communication protocols. It should strike an agreement with Cuba that is substantively similar but narrower in scope, limited to basic spill-oriented advance coordination and communication. Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government.¶ Next, President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton, should be included in the authorization.¶ Finally, Congress should alter existing oil spill compensation policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90 to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a foreign offshore unit that pollutes or threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for vessels. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation. Lawmakers should eliminate the requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on expenditures above $150 million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response Plan). And President Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of liability cap under OPA 90, balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict liability for polluters.¶ There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that would enable the country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based on acoustic, geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the U.S. Coast Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy should find out from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S. authorities predict how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout.¶ Defending U.S. Interests¶ An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without changes in current U.S. law, however, that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly than is desirable. The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies. Although a handful of U.S. spill responders hold licenses to work with Repsol, their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief drilling. The result of a slow response to a Cuban oil spill would be greater, perhaps catastrophic, economic and environmental damage to Florida and the Southeast.¶ Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory.¶ However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.¶ The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.¶ Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.

### 2nc Solvency

#### License oil companies to provide expertise for safe drilling and response equipment

Sarah Stephens (Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas) and Jake Colvin (Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council) 9/29/2011 “US-Cuba policy, and the race for oil drilling” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/184661-us-cuba-policy-and-the-race-for-oil-drilling)

To protect the national interest — and for the sake of Florida's beaches and the Gulf of Mexico's ecosystem — it is time to stop sticking our heels in the sand when it comes to U.S.-Cuba policy. Before the end of the year, a Chinese-made drilling platform known as Scarabeo 9 is expected to arrive in the Gulf. Once it is there, Cuba and its foreign partners, including Spain’s Repsol, will begin using it to drill for oil in waters deeper than Deepwater Horizon’s infamous Macondo well. The massive rig, manufactured to comply with U.S.-content restrictions at a cost of $750 million, will cost Repsol and other companies $407,000 per day to lease for exploration. They are taking this financial risk because Cuba needs the oil and its partners — Spain, Norway, Russia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, Angola, Venezuela, and possibly China — believe that drilling in waters said to contain undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil is good business. In virtually every other country in the world, developments like these would prompt high-level discussions about how to exploit these resources safely or to anticipate a crisis were a disaster to strike. Experts who have studied the currents say a spill in Cuban waters would send 90 percent of the oil into the Keys and up the East Coast of Florida. But the embargo leaves Florida’s sensitive coastal resources defenseless. Due to the fact that the drilling involves Cuba, American companies and workers cannot lend their expertise to what could be a risky operation. U.S. economic sanctions prevent our private sector from helping Cuba drill safely and paralyze the U.S. government, which ought to be convening bilateral discussions on best practices and coordinating disaster response. In fact, the U.S. has no emergency response agreement with Cuba for oil spills. While some specific licenses have been granted to permit U.S. firms to conduct limited transactions with Cuba, current sanctions bar the United States from deploying the kind of clean-up equipment, engineers, spare parts for blow-out prevention, chemical dispersants, and rigs to drill relief wells that would be needed to address an oil crisis involving Cuba. One welcomed development came earlier this month, when William Reilly, a former head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and co-chair of the Commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, led a group of experts to Cuba to take a look at their plans. While the administration has done well giving permission to Mr. Reilly, as well as to other experts, to discuss the problem with Cuban counterparts, it should move more aggressively to work with the Cuban government to cooperate on plans for safe drilling and responding to a possible crisis. Rather than moving forward, some in the U.S. Congress would make the problem worse. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-R), who criticized Mr. Reilly’s visit to Cuba as “giving credibility to the regime’s dangerous oil-drilling scheme,” has offered legislation to try and stop Repsol from drilling. Rep. Vern Buchanan (FL-R) would deny Repsol the right to drill in U.S. waters if it helped Cuba drill in its waters. Thirty-four members of both parties have written Repsol directly, threatening the company if it drills with Cuba. Yet this tactic can’t work. Even if they could deter Repsol from drilling – which is unlikely – they cannot stop Cuba and partners from countries like China, Russia, and Venezuela, from using the rig and searching for oil. At some point, it is likely that drilling will begin and the United States ought to do what it can to prepare for that eventuality. The U.S. government should facilitate access by Cuba and its drilling partners to the resources they need to drill safely. President Obama should instruct the Treasury Department to issue a blanket general license now that would allow private industry to provide what oil expert Jorge Piñon calls ”any conceivable response” in the event of a crisis.

#### Waiving embargo enforcement for oil safety solves.

Sarah Stephens (Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas) 2011 “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf

Recommendations¶ Pursue Unilateral Actions¶ • The Obama administration should aggressively and comprehensively¶ use its existing licensing authority to ensure the right firms with the best¶ equipment and expertise are in place to fight the effects of an oil spill.¶ • OFAC, the Treasury Department office that administers and enforces trade¶ sanctions, should make it clear that efforts to protect safety during drilling¶ by U.S. entities will not be met with negative regulatory consequences.¶ •The U.S. should ensure that comprehensive information-sharing with the¶ Cuban government is standard operating procedure, conducted openly¶ where possible, and without impediments in areas such as granting visas¶ for Cuban scientists and officials to visit here¶ Pursue Bilateral Activities and Agreements¶ •¶ The U.S. should enter direct discussions with Cuba on energy and¶ environmental cooperation.¶ •¶ The U.S. should look to existing models for bilateral (such as MEXUS) and¶ trilateral cooperation (as proposed by the National Commission on the¶ BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling) for environmental¶ planning with Cuba.

### A2 permutation – appeasement

#### Easing oil embargo causes appeasement. Cplan solves better

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Cuba plans to drill seven exploratory oil wells in the¶ Gulf of Mexico by 2014.1 Some argue that the threat of¶ Cuban offshore oil drilling will increase the embargo’s¶ costs and that U.S. oil companies will miss out on oil exploration¶ that will go to foreign countries.2 In response, some U.S. lawmakers¶ and U.S. oil lobbyists have advocated for an exception¶ to the Cuban embargo permitting energy cooperation.3 Notwithstanding¶ these concerns, the long-standing Cuban embargo is an¶ economic restriction with a significant purpose and should not¶ so easily be forsaken.¶ This article argues that, despite the added pressure Cuba’s¶ offshore oil developments have placed on U.S. policy, the embargo’s¶ twin goals of bringing democracy to the Cuban people¶ and ending their oppressive rule have not been met. Thus, now¶ is not the time to lift or ease the embargo. The embargo itself¶ serves to restrict Cuba’s drilling efforts4 and new legislation may¶ further hamper Cuba’s exploration.5 Additionally, the economic¶ concerns of the U.S. energy industry do not warrant a change¶ in the U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, and those concerns can¶ be better met by tapping U.S. resources. Furthermore, fears of¶ a Cuban oil spill can be assuaged through less drastic measures¶ such as an oil spill emergency response agreement with Cuba,¶ similar to the one that the United States has enacted with Mexico.

### A2 cuba not cooperate

#### Cuba will cooperate with a US oil spills response plan

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Further, spill response planning can be implemented before¶ drilling begins. The United States currently has oil spill response¶ agreements with Mexico67 and Canada,68 but not with Cuba.69¶ As the Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted, planning for disaster¶ is essential. To achieve this goal, the United States can model a Cuban plan on the Joint Contingency Plan between the United¶ Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding¶ Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharge of Hydrocarbons¶ or Other Hazardous Substances (“MEXUS Plan”).70¶ That plan originates from an agreement between Mexico and¶ the United States signed on July 24, 1980, and developed in¶ accordance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution¶ Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, adopted on November¶ 30, 1990.71 The Plan pre-designates on-scene coordinators, a¶ joint response team, response coordination centers, rapid notification¶ protocols, and communications procedures for the event¶ of an oil disaster.72 The Plan has triumphed in test simulations,¶ which validates its concepts.73¶ The United States must initiate the same level of planning¶ with Cuba. Given the proximity of potential Cuban wells¶ to the Florida coast, the need for a contingency plan is clear.¶ Fortunately, the MEXUS Plan provides a guiding framework¶ upon which the United States and Cuba can draw. Furthermore,¶ a recent Congressional report indicates that Cuba is open to¶ certain bilateral agreements with the United States, noting Raul¶ Castro’s willingness to engage with the United States where¶ mutual interests exist.74 Since an oil spill agreement is of mutual¶ interest, both countries should work to draft and implement it.

### A2 plan key quick response

#### Exemptions solves for quick response

Sarah Stephens (Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas) 2011 “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf

The Obama administration should use its existing authority now¶ to award licenses to firms and individuals with the equipment and¶ expertise to fight the effects of an oil spill.¶ As Robert Muse and Jorge Piñon said last year, the administration has regula¶ -¶ tory authority to provide licenses and promulgate new regulations for “any¶ conceivable response” to an environmental problem in Cuba.¶ 83¶ While the Cuban Assets Control Regulations administered by OFAC¶ include a variety of prohibitions that generally bar U.S. private sector participation, involvement or cooperation in connection with the exploration¶ or development of energy sector resources associated with Cuba, or related¶ environmental concerns, OFAC retains discretionary authority to license such¶ activities by U.S. persons where it is determined by the executive branch to¶ be consistent with U.S. national interests. Such licensing determinations are¶ generally within the scope of the authority of the President of the United¶ States with respect to matters of U.S. foreign policy and national security.¶ By moving far beyond the meager licensing activity that has already¶ taken place, the Obama administration could ensure that the international¶ oil companies working with Cuba have full access to U.S. technology and¶ personnel in order to prevent and/or manage a blowout.¶ Speed is of the essence in dealing with oil spills. The rate of oil spreading,¶ the degradation of the compounds which may be burned, the creation of¶ emulsions, and the arrival of storms are all time-sensitive variables that can¶ magnify the damage from a spill.¶ Rather than subjecting an environmental response to lengthy delays,¶ this new approach to licensing would enable helicopters and equipment¶ to reach the site of an environmental problem within twenty-four hours of¶ notification. A much more aggressive plan is needed in advance, replacing¶ the existing approach of providing licenses on an application-by-application¶ basis, so action can take place unencumbered by any regulatory delays at¶ the onset of a crisis.

## US Drilling

### Drilling 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government should increase drilling within the United States and its territorial waters.

#### Expanding US drilling solves dependency and doesn’t link to politics.

Jillian L. Genaw (J.D. Candidate, Indiana Univ. School of Law-Indianapolis – Indiana International & Comparative Law Review) 2010 Indiana Internationsl & Comparative Law Review

As an alternate option to the United States' lifting its OCS Moratorium, policy analysts have suggested that the United States keep the Moratorium in place but lift the economic embargo against Cuba in order to enable the United States to bid on the offshore blocs that Cuba plans to lease out to foreign nations. n225 While a discussion of the economic embargo goes well beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to take notice that it is an option that has been placed on the table. Even without a full discussion of this option, the main concerns with it can shed some light on its viability. As discussed in Part I of this Note, it makes little sense for the United States to lift an economic embargo, which has been in place since 1962, just to lease Cuban offshore drilling blocs that are so close to the U. S. coast that they would subject the United States to the same risks of environmental degradation. n226 Granted, lifting the economic embargo on Cuba would be beneficial in other areas of [\*76] trade, but if the primary motive for lifting the embargo is offshore oil drilling related then it makes very little sense. n227 There are much more accessible, less controversial avenues for allowing offshore drilling in the United States. By lifting the OCS Moratorium the United States would achieve the same benefits as it would if it leased drilling blocs from Cuba, but would also achieve greater control and oversight over the industry. n228¶ If the United States does not take action and lift the OCS Moratorium, in combination with imposing the other recommended environmental and safety regulations, it will remain heavily dependant on foreign nations for oil. Even more daunting, the United States will be forced to sit back and watch as Cuba and other nations reap the economic benefits of a substantial supply of oil so close to its own coastline. After years of debate amongst extremists on both sides of the political spectrum, the issue of offshore drilling in the OCS has been stagnated. In light of Cuba's plans to expand its oil program and with the introduction of improved technology, the environmental arguments, once convincing against offshore drilling, are now weak. After all, lifting the OCS Moratorium does not give oil companies free reign; American oil companies will be subject to strengthened technological and safety regulations, more frequent inspections, and more severe sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Because there is little the United States can do to prevent Cuba from leasing out offshore exploration blocs, located within forty-five miles of the U. S. coastline, it is wise for the United States to be proactive. If offshore drilling is to be done so close to the United States, it should be done the United States' way. As discussed in Part III of this Note, environmental policy in Cuba has historically lacked enforcement and the public has little knowledge of and appreciation for the environmental risks associated with offshore drilling. n229 Thus, the regulations over offshore drilling imposed by the Cuban government would likely be much less stringent than regulations imposed by the U. S. Government.¶ The American public, American businesses, and even some environmentalists have become increasingly supportive of opening up the OCS for offshore oil drilling. n230 Drilling technology and methodology have made major advancements, and the oil industry's reputation has become cleaner since the 1980s when the OCS Moratorium was first enacted. The United States' economy would be stimulated by participation in offshore oil drilling. The benefits are growing, and the risks have minimized. Thus, the optimal solution would be for the United States to lift the OCS Moratorium, with the directional [\*77] drilling method mandated where possible, increase the frequency of inspections, strengthen enforcement, make sanctions more severe, and create an "oil legacy" fund in preparation for a transition into more sustainable energy development. n231 The United States should continue to research other renewable, alternative energy sources as well. Taking these steps will allow the United States to remain competitive in the international marketplace, develop a self- sufficient energy sector, solve a political battle that has been looming for years, and minimize any negative impact associated with Cuba's offshore exploration bloc leasing program.

### 2nc Solvency

#### Domestic Drilling solves

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The United States Should First Utilize¶ U.S. Oil Resources¶ The United States’ thirst for oil should first be quenched¶ with local resources before resorting to end the embargo. Allowing¶ U.S. companies access to Cuban offshore oil fields would¶ effectively allow those companies to drill for oil in waters closer¶ to the U.S. coast than laws currently allow.75 J. Larry Nichols,¶ Chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural¶ gas producer, opined that “[w]hen U.S. companies are not even¶ allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we¶ have a long way to go before we can think about international¶ waters off the coast of Cuba.”76 If access to oil is indeed the¶ main U.S. rationale behind lifting the embargo, this need is best¶ met by first allowing companies to drill more extensively in U.S.¶ waters.77¶ Moreover, dependence on other countries for oil is not a¶ responsible option.78 Because the United States has the best oil¶ safety standards in the world, it is most environmentally competent¶ to tap America’s own natural resources.79 Furthermore,¶ because drilling has yet to start, there is time yet for Cuban¶ political change to occur.80 Not only is there simply no pressing¶ need for Cuban oil, as portrayed by U.S. oil lobbyists, but U.S.¶ resources offer a more attractive alternative.81

### Domestic drilling solves

#### Drilling solves – enough oil to last 100 years

Merrill and Schizer ‘13 [Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School and David M. Schizer, Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law, and Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Columbia Law School, “The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy,” 3/13, 2013, http://www7.gsb.columbia.edu/richman/sites/default/files/files/Fracturing3\_13.doc.pdf]

There is some question about the staying power of these new natural gas and oil reserves.30 For instance, drilling costs for shale oil are high, so a global decline in prices could cause companies to reduce production.31 In addition, some experts caution that fractured wells may not produce as long as conventional wells.32 Even so, estimates of recoverable reserves have generally been increasing over time.33 It may well be, as President Obama suggested in his 2012 State of the Union Address, that fracturing will generate 100 years of natural gas supply for the United States at our current rate of consumption.34

#### New study proves opening up more drilling would massively increase oil output

I.E.R. ’11 [“New Oil Finds Around the Globe: Will the U.S. Capitalize on Its Oil Resources?” Institute for Energy Research, September 13, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/09/13/new-oil-finds-around-the-globe-will-the-u-s-capitalize-on-its-oil-resources/]

The API Study What could the oil industry achieve if restrictions on oil drilling in the United States were lessened? The American Petroleum Industry commissioned a study that assumed oil drilling would be allowed off the currently prohibited areas of the East and West Coasts, in waters off Florida’s Gulf Coast, in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and on most federal public land that is not a national park. It also assumed that it would get approval to build pipelines to accommodate a doubling of Canadian oil sands production and the continuation of the tax policies currently in place for the oil industry.[xix]¶ The API commissioned the study from energy consultants Wood Mackenzie, who found that domestic production of petroleum liquids would increase from 7.8 million barrels per day in 2010 to 9 million barrels per day in 2030 under current policies due to increased production from shale oil and deepwater drilling. However, if the industry could meet the assumptions of the study, domestic liquids production could reach 15.4 million barrels per day close to the 19 million barrels a day that we currently consume. That would create 1 million new jobs over the next seven years and 1.4 million by 2030. The industry already supports more than 9 million jobs throughout the economy. The study indicates that the United States can come close to producing enough new oil and natural gas to displace all non-North American imports within 15 years. More than $800 billion in cumulative new government revenue could be generated by 2030 and $127 billion by 2020 ‚Äì equal to about two and a half years’ worth of current federal spending on roads. Most importantly, no new taxes or increased government spending is needed to accomplish the results of the study.[xx]¶ Conclusion¶ Around the globe, countries are drilling for oil onshore, offshore, and in oil shale deposits. But the United States is hampered by government rules and restrictions to developing its vast resources. Without increasing taxes and without increasing government spending, the oil industry in the United States could make us independent of non-North American oil imports. And in doing so, they could create jobs and add billions of dollars to government revenues. Why don’t we take the challenge?

# Disadvantage

## Oil

### Oil Link

#### Cuban oil production trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties

Dr. A. F. Alhajji (energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern) and Terry L. Maris (founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management) 2004 “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of massive¶ oil deposits in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

#### US would sacrifice oil contracts from the Mid-East in exchange for Cuba – saves on transport costs

Lily Fesler (Research Associate) 2009 “Cuban Oil: Havana’s Potential Geo-Political Bombshell,” June 11, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, http://www.coha.org/cuban-oil-havana%E2%80%99s-potential-geo-political-bombshell/#sthash.XL8uloIO.dpuf]

Cuban Offshore Oil¶ Desperate to end U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East, United States’ officials are certainly aware of Cuba’s oil-producing potential. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological Survey found that Cuba has 5 billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has 20 billion . Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while 20 billion barrels would make Cuba’s oil capacity comparable to that of the United States’ and place it among the top 15 oil reserves nations in the world. Either way, Cuba’s oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe. At the moment, Spain’s Repsol, Brazil’s Petrobras, and Norway’s StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana’s state oil company Cubapetroleo, said, “We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services.” U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, “Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there’s interest.” The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for 21 of the 59 offshore Cuban drilling blocks, and another 23 blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba’s nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island. Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba’s reserves “very encouraging.”¶ After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba’s oil even after all of the contracts have been signed. This could appreciably save transportation costs, because U.S. companies wouldn’t have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies’ oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers’ access to reasonably priced neighboring oil. With oil prices recovering from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel, access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious import.

### A2 Cuban oil inevitable

#### Cuban oil exploration will stay low in the squo.

Jorge Piñón 2013 (energy affairs researcher) Progreso Weekly – May 7th – http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=92634

That is the process we have conducted for the past 10 years in Cuba, which includes a study by the U.S. Geological Survey. This study, done for the first time in 2004, estimates that in Cuba’s geological north strip, off shore, from Pinar del Río Province to northern Matanzas province, there are oil reserves.¶ The surveyors raise the possibility that from 4 billion to 6 billion barrels of crude are still to be found. These geological studies are very environmental, but historically they are highly trusted by our industry. That doesn’t mean that they guarantee the amount of oil, but it’s the first step in that stage.¶ We are beyond the stage of studies; now we are in the stage of exploration. Four wells have been exploited by serious international oil companies – each well has cost at least $100 million – so, in other words, it wasn’t a political “game.”¶ So far, the hoped-for results have not materialized; at least, that’s what I’m told by sources I’ve consulted. We still have the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters in the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, adjacent to the United States’ exclusive zone. I think that there are possibilities there.¶ In my opinion, in the next three to five years, unfortunately, I don’t see a high probability that Cuba will maintain the level of exploration in deep waters such as we’ve seen in the past two or three years.

#### International oil companies are turning to other parts of the globe.

Mary O'Grady (is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journa) WSJ – April 24, 2013 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html

Remember all the hype about Cuba drilling for oil in Caribbean waters and American companies missing out on the bonanza because of the U.S. embargo? Well, like all the other Cuban get-rich-quick schemes of the past 50 years, this one seems to have flopped too.¶ Last week, Florida's Sun Sentinel reported that "after spending nearly $700 million during a decade, energy companies from around the world have all but abandoned their search for oil in deep waters off the north coast of Cuba near Florida." Separately, CubaStandard.com reported on Friday that "the shallow-water drilling platform used by Russian oil company OAO Zarubezhneft will leave Cuban waters June 1, to be redeployed to Asia."¶ According to the Sun Sentinel story, Jorge Piñon, an oil-industry guru who had been cheering Cuba's exploration attempts, said "Companies are saying, 'We cannot spend any more capital on this high-risk exploration. We'd rather go to Brazil; we'd rather go to Angola; we'd rather go to other places in the world where the technological and geological challenges are less.'"

## Politics

### Unpopular 1nc

#### Plan will get caught up in embargo debates – extremely unpopular – no risk of a link turn

Neelesh Nerurkar(Specialist in Energy Policy) and Mark P. Sullivan (Specialist in Latin American Affairs) 2011 Congressional Research Service, 2011, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf

On the opposite side of the policy debate, a number of policy groups and members of Congress oppose engagement with Cuba, including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development. A legislative initiative introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5620, would go further and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions on foreign companies and its executives who help facilitate the development of Cuba’s petroleum resources. The bill asserts that offshore drilling by or under the authorization of the Cuban government poses a “serious economic and environmental threat to the United States” because of the damage that an oil spill could cause. Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s offshore oil development also argue that such involvement would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government and thus prolong the continuation of the communist regime. They maintain that if Cuba reaped substantial economic benefits from offshore oil development, it could reduce societal pressure on Cuba to enact market-oriented economic reforms. Some who oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba’s energy development contend that while Cuba might have substantial amounts of oil offshore, it will take years to develop. They maintain that the Cuban government is using the enticement of potential oil profits to break down the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba.

### Bipartisanship

#### Partisan divide

Jonathan P. White (J.D. 2010, University of Colorado Law School) Summer, 2010 – Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy – 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 557 – lexis)

Cuba's moves to open the Florida Straits to drilling have generated a bifurcated American political response. Reminiscent of the Helms-Burton Act's effort to penalize foreign third parties, some U.S. politicians have responded to Cuba's moves by calling for laws that would deny U.S. visas to employees of foreign oil companies doing business in Cuba. n201 Legislation by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida seeks to ban companies drilling for oil in the Florida Straits from operating in the United States. n202 Other politicians have introduced legislation that would exempt U.S. companies from the expansive Cuban trade embargo in order to allow them to compete for leases off Cuba. n203 The Cuban government, meanwhile, has encouraged American oil companies to bid for tracts in Cuban-controlled waters in the Florida Straits. n204 So far, neither partisan faction has prevailed in this tug-of-war. Senator Nelson cited environmental concerns as a motivator behind his anti-drilling legislation, stating: "At risk are the Florida Keys ... not to mention the $ 8 billion Congress is investing to restore the Everglades." n205 Advocates for rescinding the U.S. trade embargo cite the drilling controversy for evidence of the embargo's counterproductive effects on the U.S. [\*588] economy. n206 In Florida itself, attitudes towards offshore drilling appear to be in flux. While Florida's federal congressional delegation continues to almost unanimously oppose offshore drilling, the Florida House of Representatives voted in April 2009 to allow drilling in state-controlled waters immediately offshore. n207 Despite the feuding in the United States over how to respond to Cuban plans to drill in the Florida Straits, if momentum in the Sunshine State itself shifts in favor of drilling offshore in state waters, then drilling in the entire Florida Straits will perhaps become less-controversial. That said, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill could change public attitudes in Florida over offshore drilling. Either way, the lingering question is whether there is any hope for a productive dialogue between the two countries over stewardship of the Florida Straits.

#### Partisan divide prevents any bipartisan solution

C. Adam Lanier (J.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina School of Law, holds a B.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) 2013 – “In Deepwater: Cuba, Offshore Drilling, and Political Brinkmanship – North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 571), Winter, Lexis-Nexis

A change in the tone of U.S. policy toward Cuba is long overdue. n175 Although there is significant bipartisan support for shifting U.S. policy toward Cuba to a more engaging model, n176 the sharply polarized environment in Washington seems to force legislators to remain at loggerheads. n177 The intransigency of the parties has led to repeated instances of brinkmanship, n178 which is counterproductive to the national interest. Engaging with Cuba in the development of its energy resources is an issue that both parties should be able to agree on, even over the objections of the minority, who continue to take a hardline approach to anything related to Cuba. n179 This issue is simply too important. As Dan Whittle, director of the Environmental Defense Fund's Cuba Project, put it: "This isn't about politics. It's about protecting our beaches, our shores, our fishermen, our communities." n180

# Case

## Cuban Economy ADV

### Economy 1nc

#### Drilling profits will be slow – not solve dependence or cutoff fears

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

Energy experts also note that examples from deep water exploratory drilling around the ¶ world demonstrate that it is not atypical to drill numerous dry or commercially unviable ¶ holes in new fields before a profitable discovery is found.24 Jorge Piñón, the former president ¶ of Amoco Oil Latin America and now an energy specialist at the University of Texas at Austin, ¶ explained that economic discoveries often play out over a longer time horizon. “A lot of people ¶ have been very naïve in thinking that an oil-rich Cuba was going to materialize overnight, and ¶ that is not the case,” Piñón said. “You don’t just turn the faucet on overnight.”25

#### No supply cutoff – new Venezuelan president is an ally

Peter Orsi 4/5 “Cuba avoids oil cutoff for now as Chavez ally narrowly wins Venezuela presidential election”, http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Cuba+avoids+cutoff+Chavez+ally+narrowly+wins+Venezuela+presidential+election/8244434/story.html

Cubans were relieved Monday by the announcement that the late leader Hugo Chavez's hand-picked successor had been elected Venezuela's new president, apparently allowing their country to dodge a threatened cutoff of billions of dollars in subsidized oil. Cuban President Raul Castro sent a congratulatory message to Nicolas Maduro, who is seen as an ideological ally who will want to continue the countries' special relationship as he serves out the remainder of Chavez's six-year term. "The main thing from Cuba's point of view is that he's won, if it's ratified," said Paul Webster Hare, a lecturer in international relations at Boston University and former British diplomatic envoy to both Venezuela and Cuba. "They will probably be thinking that they now have perhaps a maximum of five years of Venezuelan subsidies left," Hare said, "because if the trend continues moving against him, as I think is likely, this will be the last term even if they are able to continue all the subsidies for that period. ... The clock's ticking for that relationship."

#### Bioterror risk is low—dispersal problems, tech barriers, risk of back spread—experts agree

John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, 2009, p. 21-22.

For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties—as an aerosol that can be inhaled—requires a delivery system whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist" Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions." After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal pathogens effectively, biological weapons expert Milton Leitenberg compares his conclusions with glib pronouncements in the press about how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and a few glass jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer." He sardonically concludes, "The less the commentator seems to know about biological warfare the easier he seems to think the task is.""

#### No risk of bioterror and there’s no impact.

Alan Reynolds on March 11, 2010 (Senior Fellow at CATO Institute and former Director of Economic Research at the Hudson Institute, “Anthrax and the WMD Fear Lobby,” http://original.antiwar.com/alan-reynolds/2010/03/10/anthrax-and-the-wmd-fear-lobby/)

Nuclear warfare is still counted as WMD, yet the WMD Commission is more afraid of anthrax or Botox.  Weapons of Mass Destruction used to include chemical warfare, but no longer.  Fretting about nerve gas turned out to be a less lucrative fear-mongering industry than lobbying for juicy biological research grants, and for mountainous stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral drugs. "Especially troubling," says the Commission, "is the lack of priority given to the development of… new vaccines, drugs, and production processes required to meet the modern threats from man-made and naturally occurring epidemics."  Priority means an extra $17 billion of deficit spending over five years.   But notice how "naturally occurring epidemics" were snuck into a report ostensibly dealing with terrorist weapons.  Alleged sources of a bioterrorist threats "include the bacteria that cause anthrax and plague, the viruses that cause smallpox and Ebola hemorrhagic fever, and poisons of natural origin such as ricin and botulinum toxin."   The Commission knows those agents are far less credible terrorist weapons than bombs, guns, airplanes and arson.  (Anyone who tries to kill you with Ebola would die trying). So they are stuck with anthrax, claiming "a bioterrorist attack involving anthrax bacterial spores [is] the most likely near-term biological threat to the United States."  Billions were wasted because of anthrax in 2001, and the Commission is determined to waste billions more.  For those receiving federal loot, Bruce Ivins was a gift that keeps on giving. The Commission report said, "The 2001 anthrax mailings were not the first incident of bioterrorism in the United States. In 1984, the Rajneeshees, a religious cult in Oregon, sought to reduce voter turnout and win control of the county government in an upcoming election by temporarily incapacitating local residents with a bacterial infection. In . . . September 1984, cult members contaminated 10 restaurant salad bars in a town in Oregon with salmonella, a common bacterium that causes food poisoning. The attack sickened 751 people, some seriously." Sickened seriously!  If that isn’t WMD, what is?  "A decade later," the report goes on, "members of a Japanese doomsday cult called Aum Shinrikyo released anthrax bacterial spores from the roof of a building in Tokyo. Fortunately, this attack failed. . . Had Aum succeeded in acquiring a virulent strain and delivered it effectively, the casualties could have been in the thousands."   That is illiterate nonsense. There is no effective way of dispersing anthrax from the roof of a building.  Lacking evidence, the WMD lobby dreams up scenarios. The report tells us White House insecurity experts "created a chilling scenario of how terrorists could launch an anthrax attack in the United States [with] a single aerosol attack in one city delivered by a truck using a concealed improvised spraying device."    This "chilling scenario" is science fiction. In "WMD Doomsday Distractions,"an April 2005 column available at Cato.org, I explained that, "Scenario spinners speculate about mixing anthrax with water and somehow spraying it (without detection) from trucks, crop dusters or unmanned aircraft. But to die from anthrax, you need to inhale thousands of spores. Those spores clump together and mix with dust, yet they must end up neither too large nor too small, or else they would be sneezed out, coughed up or swallowed. Even if enough particles of the perfect size could be sprayed into the breezes, the odds are extremely low of infecting more than few dozen people that way. And none would die if they took Cipro promptly." Tallying up all of the world’s bioterrorism attacks to date, the final score is five killed from anthrax, plus one Bulgarian assassinated by being injected with ricin.  That brings the world total of bioterrorist fatalities up to half a dozen — a bizarre concept of "mass destruction," and a feeble excuse for dispensing billions more federal dollars to those using scare tactics to raid the empty Treasury.

### No Cuban Oil

#### No commercially viable oil in Cuba – companies are backing out

Gibson 4/14 (William – Washington Bureau, “Companies abandon search for oil in Cuba's deep waters”, 2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-04-14/news/fl-cuban-oil-drilling-retreat-20130414\_1\_jorge-pi-north-coast-cuban-officials)

After spending nearly $700 million during a decade, energy companies from around the world have all but abandoned their search for oil in deep waters off the north coast of Cuba near Florida, a blow to the Castro regime but a relief to environmentalists worried about a major oil spill. Decisions by Spain-based Repsol and other companies to drill elsewhere greatly reduce the chances that a giant slick along the Cuban coast would ride ocean currents to South Florida, threatening its beaches, inlets, mangroves, reefs and multibillion-dollar tourism industry. The Coast Guard remains prepared to contain, skim, burn or disperse a potential slick. And Cuban officials still yearn for a lucrative strike that would prop up its economy. A Russian company, Zarubezhneft, is drilling an exploratory well in shallower waters hugging the Cuban shoreline south of the Bahamas. But though some oil has been found offshore, exploratory drilling in deep waters near currents that rush toward Florida has failed to reveal big deposits that would be commercially viable to extract, discouraging companies from pouring more money into the search. "Those companies are saying, 'We cannot spend any more capital on this high-risk exploration. We'd rather go to Brazil; we'd rather go to Angola; we'd rather go to other places in the world where the technological and geological challenges are less,'" said Jorge Piñon, an oil-industry analyst at the University of Texas who consults with U.S. and Cuban officials as well as energy companies. "I don't foresee any time in the future exploration in Cuba's deep-water north coast. It is, for all practical purposes, over."

#### No commercially viable oil – recent efforts prove

Offshore Mag 12 (Offshore Magazine, “Another Cuban oil well turns up dry”, 11/25, http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2012/11/another-cuban-oil.html)

The Venezuelan government-owned company PDVSA reported that it found no commercially viable oil in Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico, making their exploration well the third unsuccessful search for oil in recent months, reported the Havana Times. Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and CUPET closed their exploratory well last week in Cabo de San Antonio, off the far western end of the island, having found no “potential for commercial exploitation,” the Cuban state-run enterprise Cubapetroleo (CUPET) explained. Nevertheless, PDVSA will continue to operate in Cuba, according to a statement by the company. “The technical expertise and valuable geological information obtained have contributed to reaffirming PDVSA’s decision to continue its participation in the exploration campaign in Cuban waters,” read the statement. This finding is another setback for the Cuban government. The present effort was the third failed attempt to find oil in the Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In late May, the Spanish energy company Repsol announced it was shutting down its oil exploration effort off the coast of Cuba after failing to find oil on its first bore.

#### Err negative – US surveys show that Cuba has a high probability of low oil

Portela 12 (Armando, “Third dry well dashes Cuba’s hopes for oil independence”, 8/22, http://www.cubanews.com/sections/third-dry-well-dashes-cubas-hopes-for-oil-independence/)

Not all specialists, however, are that enthused. The U.S. Geological Survey assesses Cuba’s potential petroleum reserves at just under 4.6 billion barrels, with a range of one billion barrels at 95% probability, and nine billion barrels at 5% probability. In private, since they refuse to discuss their opinions publicly, Cuban geologists admit there’s a lack of information. They also say analogies between Cuba’s offshore zones and other promising oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico are misleading. At least some are downright skeptical when confronted with Cupet’s estimates of “giant” offshore oil and gas fields.

### No Supply Cutoff

#### New election proves – cutoff is unlikely

AP 4/15 (Associated Press, “Cuba avoids oil cutoff for now as Chavez ally narrowly wins Venezuela presidential election”, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/04/15/cuba-avoids-oil-cutoff-for-now-as-chavez-ally-narrowly-wins-venezuela/)

Cubans are relieved that the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez's hand-picked successor has been elected president. The island nation has benefitted from billions of dollars in subsidized oil under Chavez. New President Nicolas Maduro is seen as an ideological ally who will want to continue the countries' special relationship. But Maduro's razor-thin victory margin has his rival demanding a recount, and experts warn that Cuba's relief could be short-lived. Cuban President Raul Castro was among the first to congratulate Maduro in a note that was published Monday in Communist Party newspaper Granma.

### Bioterror Defense – threat low

#### Threat exaggerated—empirical record proves

Gregory D. Koblentz, Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs and Deputy Director, Biodefense Program, George Mason University, "Biosecurity Reconsidered," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2010, p. 96+, ASP.

The threat of bioterrorism, may not be as severe as some have portrayed it to be. Few terrorist groups have attempted to develop a biological weapons capability, and even fewer have succeeded. Prior to the anthrax letter attacks in 2001, only one group, the disciples of guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh in Oregon, managed to cause any casualties with a biological agent. 86 The U.S. intelligence community estimates that of the fifteen terrorist groups that have expressed an interest in acquiring biological weapons, only three have demonstrated a commitment to acquiring the capability to cause mass casualties with these weapons. 87 Groups such as Japan's Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaida have demonstrated the desire to cause mass casualties and an interest in using disease as a weapon. Despite concerted efforts by both groups to produce deadly pathogens and toxins, however, neither has caused any casualties with such weapons, let alone developed a weapon capable of causing mass casualties. The failures experienced by these groups illustrate the significant hurdles that terrorists face in progressing beyond crude weapons suitable for assassination and the contamination of food supplies to biological weapons based on aerosol dissemination technology that are capable of causing mass casualties. 88

#### here’s more ev – the Bioterror risk exaggerated – it’s just a conspiracy

Birch ’06 (Douglas -- Sun foreign correspondent-- Baltimore Sun – June 18th – lexis)

Despite the concern of many scientists, some bioweapons experts say the fears are overblown. In a book last year, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, Milton Leitenberg, a biowarfare expert at the University of Maryland, College Park, wrote that the threat of bioterror "has been systematically and deliberately exaggerated" by an "edifice" of government-funded institutes and experts who run programs and conferences. Germ weapons need to be carefully cultured, transported, stored and effectively disseminated, said Raymond Zilinskas, a policy expert and biologist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Groups like al-Qaida and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo attempted, and abandoned, efforts to make germ weapons because the task was too difficult.

#### Bioterrorism unlikely: (1) difficult to weaponize; (2) unpredictable

Jacqueline Simon, former member, SIPRI Chemcial and Biological Warfare Project, “Implications of the Terror Attacks for the BWC,” INESAP INFORMATION BULLETIN n. 19, March 2002, pp. 4-7.

The threat posed by chemical and biological weapons has often been misrepresented. While manufacturing chemical agents or obtaining biological agents is not particularly difficult, it is not easy, and using these agents to cause mass casualty is extremely difficult. In order to cause mass casualty it is necessary to take into account the lethality of an agent, its concentration, environmental factors, and resistance of the population. Even more difficult is to combine all of these factors with an effective method of dispersal. All of the elements of this equation must be mastered in order to achieve significant results. That would require extensive resources and scientific knowledge inaccessible to most terrorists. An oft-cited example of the failure of a terrorist group to achieve success with its biological warfare projects is the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which, despite vast funds and experienced scientists, was unable to wage a successful biological attack. This example also illustrates the unpredictability of biological weapons which has made them unattractive to many militaries and terrorist organizations

#### risk of bioterror low—based on vulnerability assessments, not actual threats—their claims have little grounding in realiy

Jacqueline Simon, former member, SIPRI Chemcial and Biological Warfare Project, “Implications of the Terror Attacks for the BWC,” INESAP INFORMATION BULLETIN n. 19, March 2002, pp. 4-7.

The events of September 11 and the anthrax incidents that followed have led to a sea change in public perception and policy response with regard to biological weapons. The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington and the anthrax letters have become irrevocably linked in the public psyche. This linkage has led to the expansion of America's defensive goals and the marriage of two previously distinct security threats, terrorism and attack by nuclear, chemical or particularly biological weapon. The progeny of this marriage, 'bio-terrorism', has vaulted to the top of the list of threats to international security, within the United States most obviously, but in many other states as well. This focus on bio-terrorism as the scourge of the new millennium will have a serious impact on proliferation policies worldwide. As the Cold War with its foundation of nuclear deterrence faded into the background of public consciousness, chemical and biological weapons had begun to move to the forefront and gained increasing prominence in policy circles and the media as the "greatest threat to international security". Nuclear weapons were not forgotten, but lumped in with chemical and biological weapons under the misnomer and catch phrase 'weapons of mass destruction'. While the likelihood of the use of chemical and biological weapons was viewed as increasing, their use on Western soil was still regarded by most analysts as a distant threat. Many of the assumptions behind this view have been shattered and reconstructed since the events of the autumn of 2001. For persons living in North America (and many others worldwide) it undeniably 'feels' like the threat of attack by terrorists or weapons of mass casualty has increased. However, this is a feeling based in a newfound sense of vulnerability rather than an actual increase in the threat itself. Analysts, intelligence agencies, and policymakers have been aware of the threat posed by these weapons for many years and this threat has not increased exponentially since September 11. Attack by biological weapons causing mass casualty is largely regarded as a low-probability, high consequence event. In other words, if such an event did occur the results would be devastating, but the likelihood of occurrence is very small. Most analysis conducted on potential biological weapons attack has focussed on attack by a state actor whose motivations, if not capabilities, are generally known. In the case of a terrorist attack however, it is very difficult to gain any information about the motivations, capabilities and intent of the enemy. This has resulted in a situation where vulnerability assessments are widely substituted for threat assessments and policy is based on worst-case scenario projections with little grounding in reality.

### Bioterror Defense – no spread/extinction

#### Bioweapons won’t spread and cause epidemics – even if they do, not many would die

Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### Even if successful at dispersal – No extinction.

Malcolm Gladwell on November 24, 1999 (Staff writer for the new Yorker, “Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints,” p. 31-32)

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

### Bioterror Defense – terrorist not use

#### Terrorists not interested in bioweapons—Al Qaeda last pursued in 2001

Keith Johnson, “Gains in Bioscience Cause Terror Fears,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8—11—10, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703722804575369394068436132.html>, accessed 5-4-11.

Both houses of Congress have legislation in the works to strengthen the country's ability to detect, prevent and, if necessary, recover from large-scale attacks using bioweapons. All the government attention comes despite the absence of known terrorist plots involving biological weapons. According to U.S. counterterrorism officials, al Qaeda last actively tried to work with bioweapons—specifically anthrax—before the 2001 invasion of that uprooted its leadership from Afghanistan. While terrorists have on occasion used chemical weapons—such as chlorine and sarin gas—none have yet employed a biological agent, counterterrorism officials and bioweapons researchers say. The U.S. anthrax attacks were ultimately blamed on a U.S. scientist with access to military bioweapons programs.

#### Formidible tech barriers and easy alts check bioterror

John Paranchi, Analyst, RAND Corporation, “Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism, and Preventive Responses,” RAND TESTIMONY, November 2001. Available from the World Wide Web at: [www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT186/CT186.pdf](http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT186/CT186.pdf),

Sub-national groups or individuals can develop or acquire their own biological weapons capabilities for clandestine use, but it is not easy. Terrorist groups and individuals historically have not employed biological weapons because of a combination of formidable barriers to acquisition and use and comparatively readily available alternatives and disincentives. Procurement of materials and recruitment of people with skills and know-how are formidable barriers. Even if some of the materials and production equipment are procurable for legitimate scientific or industrial purposes, handling virulent biological materials and fashioning them into weapons capable of producing mass casualties is beyond the reach of most sub-national groups or individuals. In the last twenty years, there are only two significant cases of sub-national groups using or attempting to use biological weapons and a few cases where groups or individuals made efforts to acquire biological materials. In 1984, the Rajneeshees, a religious cult group located in Oregon, sought to win a local election by running its own candidates and intentionally poisoning local townspeople who they expected would vote against them.4 Using their medical clinics, cult members ordered a variety of bacterial cultures from the American Type Culture Collection located in Maryland. They contaminated ten salad bars with a strain of salmonella, sickening at least 751 people. They used commercially available biological agents to incapacitate people clandestinely, because it was important for them to avoid attracting attention. The intentional character of the outbreak was not recognized for over a year, when members of the cult revealed details about the attacks to authorities in exchange for lighter sentences stemming from other charges.

### Bioterror Defense – no dispersal

#### Multiple technical barriers to bioterror

Jonathan Tucker 2000, visiting fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, CURRENT HISTORY, April 2K, p.151.

Although some terrorist groups may be motivated by the desire to inflict mass casualties and a subset may be capable of avoiding premature arrest, the technical challenges associated with the production and efficient dissemination of chemical or biological agents make **catastrophic** attacks unlikely Acquiring such a capability would require terrorists to overcome a series of major hurdles: hiring technically trained personnel with the relevant expertise, gaining access to specialized chemical weapon ingredients or virulent microbial strains, obtaining equipment suitable for the mass-production of chemical or biological agents, and developing wide area delivery systems. Toxic weapons also entail hazards and operational uncertainties much greater than those associated with firearms and explosives.

#### Prefer our evidence ---- theirs is clear exaggeration

Andrew O’Neil, lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Flinders University, April 2003, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1, ebscohost, p. 109

Given the high stakes involved, it is all too easy to exaggerate possible scenarios involving terrorists using WMD. Yet it is equally easy to dismiss possible threat scenarios as being unduly alarmist. As the head of the United Nation’s Terrorism Prevention Branch has remarked, the greatest challenge in evaluating the WMD terrorist threat is ‘walking the fine line between fear and paranoia on the one hand, and prudence and disbelief on the other’ (Schmid 2000: 108). One of the most prevalent features in mainstream discussions of WMD terrorism has been the conflation of motive and capability. All too often observers assume that simply because terrorist groups are motivated to acquire WMD they will be successful in doing so. A related assumption is that once terrorists gain access to WMD materials they will, ipso facto, be able to build a weapon and deliver it against assigned targets. The prevalence of this approach has meant that insufficient attention has been paid to addressing the key issue of accessibility to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on the part of terrorist groups and the likelihood of such groups actually using WMD. Consequently, the challenging nature of assessing the threat of WMD terrorism has frequently been overlooked in much of the academic literature. Simply accepting at face value the hypothesis that WMD terrorism is only ‘a matter of time’ is no substitute for detailed and measured threat assessment. As I have argued, the issue is complex and not one that lends itself to hard and fast conclusions. On the one hand, I demonstrated that it remains very difficult for all but the most technologically advanced terrorist organisations to successfully weaponise nuclear material and CW and BW agents for delivery against targets. This is particularly the case with respect to nuclear weapons, but also holds true for chemical and biological weapons. In the case of biological weapons—which have become the most feared category of WMD in terms of likely terrorist use—although the requisite material for devising BW agents is widely available, the skill and expertise for effectively weaponising a BW agent is still seemingly beyond terrorist groups. Overall, acquiring WMD capabilities for delivery against targets is a lot harder for terrorists than is generally acknowledged in the literature.

#### No bioterror – dispersal impossible

Scherer 03 (John L., Minn.-based freelance writer, edited the yearbook Terrorism: An Annual Survey in 1982-83 and the quarterly Terrorism from 1986 to 2001, “Is terrorism's threat overblown?,” National Affairs, Jan, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1272/is\_2692\_131/ai\_96268286)

Chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) attacks are possible, but **difficult and unlikely**. Only one has succeeded over the last two decades--the 1995 Sarin incident on the Tokyo subway. Thousands were injured, but just six people died. There have been no CBN attacks with mass fatalities anywhere. Terrorist "experts" simply have thought up everything terrible that can happen, and then assumed it will. Terrorists would encounter problems dispersing biological toxins. Most quickly dilute in any open space, and others need perfect weather conditions to cause mass casualties. Some biological agents, although not anthrax, are killed by exposure to ultraviolet light. The Washington, D.C., subway system has devices that can detect biological toxins. New York has the highest-density population of any American city, and for this reason might have the greatest probability of such an attack, but it also has the best-prepared public health system. In one instance, Essid Sami Ben Khemais, a Moroccan who ran Al Qaeda's European logistics center in Milan, Italy, received a five-year prison sentence in February, 2002. His cell planned to poison Rome's water supply near the U.S. embassy on the Via Veneto. This group had 10 pounds of potassium ferro-cyanide, a chemical used to make wine and ink dye, but extracting a deadly amount of cyanide from this compound would have proved extremely difficult.

### A2 Naval power

#### Our fleet can take anyone’s—no challengers

Work 12 Robert O, United States Under Secretary of the Navy and VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "The Coming Naval Century," May, Proceedings Magazine - Vol. 138/5/1311, US Naval Institute, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/coming-naval-century

For those in the military concerned about the impact of such cuts, I would simply say four things:¶ • Any grand strategy starts with an assumption that all resources are scarce, requiring a balancing of commitments and resources. As political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote: “The nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means, and its means equal to its purposes.”¶ • The upcoming defense drawdown will be less severe than past post–World War II drawdowns. Accommodating cuts will be hard, but manageable.¶ • At the end of the drawdown, the United States will still have the best and most capable armed forces in the world. The President well appreciates the importance of a world-class military. “The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances,” he said. “We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced.”¶ • Most important, as the nation prioritizes what is most essential and brings into better balance its commitments and its elements of national power, we will see the beginning of a Naval Century—a new golden age of American sea power.¶ The Navy Is More Than Ships¶ Those who judge U.S. naval power solely by the number of vessels in the Navy’s battle force are not seeing the bigger picture. Our battle force is just one component—albeit an essential one—of a powerful National Fleet that includes the broad range of capabilities, capacities, and enablers resident in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It encompasses our special-mission, prepositioning, and surge-sealift fleets; the ready reserve force; naval aviation, including the maritime-patrol and reconnaissance force; Navy and Marine special operations and cyber forces; and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Moreover, it is crewed and operated by the finest sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilian mariners, and government civilians in our history, and supported by a talented and innovative national industrial base.¶ If this were not enough, the heart of the National Fleet is a Navy–Marine Corps team that is transforming itself from an organization focused on platforms to a total-force battle network that interconnects sensors, manned and unmanned platforms with modular payloads, combat systems, and network-enabled weapons, as well as tech-savvy, combat-tested people into a cohesive fighting force. This Fleet and its network would make short work of any past U.S. Fleet—and of any potential contemporary naval adversary

#### No impact to naval power

Tillman 9 (Barrett Tillman, Historian specializing in naval and aviation topics, 2009. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, “Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era,” http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY\_ID=1896)

In attempting to justify a Cold War force structure, many military pundits cling to the military stature of China as proof of a possible large conventional-war scenario against a pseudo-peer rival. Since only China possesses anything remotely approaching the prospect of challenging American hegemony—and only in Asian waters—Beijing ergo becomes the "threat" that justifies maintaining the Cold War force structure. China's development of the DF-21 long-range antiship ballistic missile, presumably intended for American carriers, has drawn much attention. Yet even granting the perfection of such a weapon, the most obvious question goes begging: why would China use it? Why would Beijing start a war with its number-two trading partner—a war that would ruin both economies?10 Furthermore, the U.S. Navy owns nearly as many major combatants as Russia and China combined. In tonnage, we hold a 2.6 to 1 advantage over them. No other coalition—actual or imagined—even comes close. But we need to ask ourselves: does that matter? In today's world the most urgent naval threat consists not of ships, subs, or aircraft, but of mines-and pirates.11

### A2 Hegemony

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.¶ The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.¶ Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.¶ However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.¶ It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

### A2 Refugee crisis

#### Refugee crisis inevitable – new travel laws

Brinkley 2012 [Joel, World Affairs, “The Coming Surge of Cuban Refugees”, December 25, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/coming-surge-cuban-refugees]

No one in Washington seems to be paying any attention to a new Cuban law that takes effect next month, possibly bringing drastic consequences for the United States. In October, the Cuban government announced that it would no longer require the much-hated exit visa for anyone wishing to travel abroad. All a Cuban citizen will need is a passport and a visa for the country he plans to visit. This new Cuban policy takes effect January 14th. The problem is, under current American law, a “visit” to the United States can immediately award a Cuban full refugee status, then permanent residency and citizenship, under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. For decades, Cubans have been trying to sail to the US and then dock or swim ashore before immigration agents catch up with them. For those who made it past the US Coast Guard gauntlet, once their feet touched the beach they were given legal admission. During the fiscal year that ended in September, the Coast Guard said it caught 1,275 Cubans trying to arrive by boat—the highest total since 2008. Uncounted others made it ashore, where they immediately received their unique American embrace. Starting January 14th, however, Cuba will allow them to leave by any means of their choice. And all they’ll have to do is walk off the airplane in Miami or anywhere else in the US to be awarded refugee status. The change could lead to many thousands of new Cuban refugees every month, joining the two million Cubans and their descendants already here. But you don’t hear anyone in Washington even mentioning this problem, given the urgent concerns about Iran, North Korea, the fiscal cliff, and so much else. The only national leader who’s gotten close to raising this concern is Representative David Rivera, a Florida Republican, who addressed it during a campaign debate in October with his opponent, Joe Garcia—who ended winning the election. Rivera spoke of revising the existing US law—but not to avert a flood of new Cuban refugees. A Cuba hard-liner, he complained about Cubans who availed themselves of the benefits America offers—but then returned to Cuba, even just for a visit. These people, Rivera averred, should not be allowed to become American citizens. Already the number of Cubans coming to the US under the existing laws is spiking this year. Now, more of them are coming across the borders from Mexico and Canada, immigration officials say. But that shows a hunger to leave that is growing urgent—even before the new law takes effect. While the Cuban Adjustment Act is not on the government’s agenda right now, when the flood of new Cuban immigrants begins arriving next month, that is almost certain to change.

### A2 LNG

#### Zero risk of LNG explosions – empirics and new tech

Melhem et al 06 – PhD, Professor of Structural Engineering

(Dr. G. A. Melhem, Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Dr. S. Saraf “Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths” updated 2006, http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf)

Historical review of LNG safety in the United States and worldwide

The LNG industry in the United States and worldwide enjoys an exceptional marine and land safety record. In the past thirty years, Japan has received nearly all of its natural gas in the form of LNG transported by ship. Once every 20 hours an LNG ship arrives at the busy Tokyo bay, unloads its LNG cargo, and leaves safely. In the last three decades and with more than 40,000 voyages by sea worldwide, there has not been a single reported LNG release from a ship’s cargo tank. LNG tankers have experienced groundings and collisions during this period, but none has resulted in a major spill. This is partly due to the double-hulled design of LNG tankers which offers significant protection to the double walled LNG containers. During the past sixty years of LNG operations, not a single general public fatality has occurred anywhere in the world because of LNG operations.

This exceptional safety record can be attributed to several key factors: (a) The LNG industry understands the physical and chemical hazard characteristics3 of LNG and have used that knowledge to instill and maintain an excellent safety culture in LNG operations and to advance the engineering of safety systems and standards4 for storage and transport of LNG, (b) The LNG industry is heavily regulated5 in the United States and worldwide, and (c) The use of multiple layers of safeguarding (primary containment, secondary containment, instrumented safety systems, operational systems, and safe separation distances) is common practice in LNG systems and operations.

#### LNG explosions don’t cause extinction

AS Kalelkar, 8/2006, Dr. G. A. Melhem (President and CEO @ ioMosaic), Dr. A. S. Kalelkar (Principal Consultant @ ioMosaic), Dr. S. Saraf (partner @ ioMosaic), and Henry Ozog (general partner @ ioMosaic), “Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths,” ioMosaic Corporation (a leading provider of safety and risk management consulting services), http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf

Myth No. 1 An LNG tanker holds thirty three million gallons of LNG, or twenty billion gallons of natural gas, the energy equivalent of fifty five Hiroshima bombs.

Fact :The estimation of hazard based on energy content is very misleading and erroneous. Using the same flawed reasoning relating LNG energy content to hazard potential, one can conclude that:

• 3 hours of sun shine over 10 square feet equals 3.2 lbs of TNT explosive

• A 24 gal automobile gasoline tank equals 1,225 lbs of TNT explosive

• 1,000 lbs of wood equals 3,530 lbs of TNT explosive

• 1,000 lbs of coal equals 4,470 lbs of TNT explosive

Hazard potential depends on both the amount of energy and the rate at which it is released. Energy release during LNG burning is relatively slow. Explosion energy is released “lightning-like” causing the formation of a shock wave that travels outwards and can cause severe damage to people and property.

### LNG – no impact – no targeting

#### No impact and no incentive for an LNG attack

Farrell 7 (Richard Farrell, Summer 2007, analyst for Chamber Corporation, “Maritime Terrorism,” Naval War College Review, Vol 60 No 3, EBSCO)

A recent study by the ioMosaic Corporation draws upon field measurements, operational information, and engineering information on LNG vessels gathered over the last sixty years."' It takes into account terrorism and other twenty-first- century threats. The overall conclusion is straightforward—that in the highly unlikely event of a very large scale release of liquified natural gas on land or water, significant effects will be felt in the immediate vicinity.'"50 However, the zone of impact would not extend anywhere close to the thirty miles predicted by some groups." As long as an LNG vapor cloud is unconfined, it will not explode. A cloud reaching a populated area would quickly find an ignition source and burn back to the spill site before it could cover large numbers of people. If inflicting mass casualties is the terrorist goal, LNG facilities and tankers are not good targets. CONTINUED. TEXT OMITTED. THIS IS FOOTNOTE 50. 50 According to Kalelkar et al. (p. 4), available data and explosion dynamics indicate that it is not possible to detonate LNG vapors, even with an explosive charge on a storage tank, unless the LNG vapors contain high fractions of ethane and propane (more than 20 per- cent). They claim that the likelihood of this scenario is equivalent to winning the Powerball or Megabucks lottery several times simultaneously. For impact, p. 22

### LNG – no impact – no explosion

#### No impact to LNG explosion

Styles 4 (Geoffrey SW, Managing Director – GSW Strategy Group, LLC, “Energy Outlook”, 5-14, http://energyoutlook.blogspot.com/2004/05/lng-disaster-movie-front-page-of-last.html)

The other remarkable feature of this situation is the degree of fear being instilled by those opposed to the LNG terminals. Although I don't fault communities for wanting a say in the kind of industrial facilities that will be in close proximity to them, those discussions should still be based on fact and not wild ravings. The Wall Street Journal cited one LNG opponent who claimed that the destructive potential of an LNG tanker was equivalent to 55 Hiroshima bombs (see analysis below). This reflects an irrational fear, bolstered by junk science. It's hard to argue with, but we cannot base the nation's energy policies on paranoia. Many have picked up on the [explosion](http://www.energy.ca.gov/lng/news_items/2004-01_algeria_factsheet.html) at the LNG plant in Skikda, Algeria (see my blog of [January 21](http://energyoutlook.blogspot.com/2004_01_01_energyoutlook_archive.html)) as evidence of the risks of handling LNG, but even if that were a fair comparison--and there are good reasons why it is not--it is actually a pretty good illustration that the risks are similar to those associated with many kinds of industrial facilities and not orders of magnitude greater, as activists assert. Having recently seen prosaic and trusted objects turned into deadly weapons, it is natural to worry a bit more about LNG than we might have a few years ago. Every LNG tanker--along with every crude oil or gasoline tanker, tank truck, or rail car--has the potential for destructive misuse. Yet we have not grounded all airplanes for fear they will be turned into cruise missiles, nor can we shun every link in the energy chain on which we all rely. While we can minimize risk, we cannot eliminate it. And if you don't want the LNG terminal in your neighborhood, for reasons that seem perfectly valid to you, just exactly whose neighborhood are you proposing as an alternative? Or are you and your neighbors prepared to take your houses off the gas grid and heat them with something else? Finally, for anyone interested in the atomic bomb comparison, a few facts: 1. A fully loaded LNG tanker of 120,000 cubic meters capacity holds about 50,000 tons of methane. 2. The yield of the Hiroshima bomb was equivalent to 21,000 tons of TNT. 3. Conservatively assuming that TNT and methane have the same energy content gives you a ratio of 2.5, not 55, but we are not done yet. 4. An atomic bomb releases its energy (from the conversion of matter into energy, via our old friend e=mc^2) in 1/1000th of a second. This makes for a stupendous flash and explosion, with a surface temperature comparable to that of the sun. This is why every H-bomb has an A-bomb trigger.5. A chemical explosion of methane requires a narrow range of air/fuel mix (5-15%) that could not be achieved all at once for the entire volume of an LNG tanker. In the real world, it would take many seconds and probably minutes to consume all the available fuel. 6. The difference between points 4 and 5 above is analogous to the difference between going from 60-0 mph by hitting a brick wall, compared to a panic stop using the brakes. The same energy is released, but in very different ways. 7. If it were easy to liberate nuclear weapon yields from large quantities of fuel, people would be doing this routinely. The closest we get is something like [this](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/fae.htm). And note that there is an enormous distinction between achieving A-bomb-like overpressures in a very limited radius with a fuel/air device vs. the kind of wide-scale effects of an actual nuclear explosion.

### LNG – no impact – safety systems

#### No accidents –

#### A) Double hulls

Quoddy 8 (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

The ships will employ both double containment of their contents and double hulls, ensuring a very low risk of any spills or accidents. This full containment ensures that if leaks or spills do occur, the LNG will be contained and isolated. The double hulls ensure a very low risk that any breach would even reach the hull containment tanks. The vessels are designed with a double hull to ensure minimization of leakage in the event of a collision or grounding, as well as separate ballast.

#### B) Safety systems

Quoddy 8 (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

LNG facilities have extensive, state-of-the-art warning systems, including gas detectors, ultraviolet or infrared fire detectors, smoke or combustion product detectors, low temperature detectors, and detectors to monitor LNG levels and vapor pressures. Codes and standards from state, national, and international agencies and institutions insure the chances of any releases are very small, and if there are releases, the volume of the release is minimal. In addition to warning systems, LNG facilities have automated firefighting systems, including foam, dry chemical, or water dispersal and automatic shutdown systems.

#### Multiple checks prevent LNG terrorism

Quoddy 8 (Bay LLC, “Safety & Security”, http://www.quoddylng.com/safety.html)

Are LNG tankers and storage facilities likely terrorist targets? ¶ All parts of our critical energy infrastructure have been reassessed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Security consciousness throughout the United States is heightened. Shippers have redoubled their already-stringent efforts to ensure security of transportation and the safety of terminals. There is no indication that LNG facilities or ships are more likely terrorist targets than other cargo ships or higher visibility political targets such as federal or state landmarks, public gatherings or bridges and tunnels. Nonetheless, LNG suppliers work closely with U.S. agencies charged with national security, and many developers contract with international experts who test their plans, procedures, people, and training to ensure they are sound. First, stringent access controls exist at both the point of origin and the point of destination. Both the liquefaction and re-gasification terminals have gated security access and continuous surveillance monitoring. Next, highly specialized, well-trained personnel serve as crewmembers. Before an LNG ship enters U.S. waters, the immigration service validates the crew. There is a buffer zone required between tankers and other traffic, and tugboats control the direction of tankers as they approach a terminal. Oversight is handled by the U.S. Coast Guard and host port authority pilots. Finally, the Coast Guard boards ships before they enter U.S. waters if it deems the ship a security risk.

### A2 African war

#### No risk of great power conflict over Africa

Robert Barrett, PhD student Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, June 1, 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN\_ID726162\_code327511.pdf?abstractid=726162&mirid=1

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.

#### International multilateral action solves the impact to African instability

Theo Neethling, Chair of the Subject Group Political Science (Mil) in the School for Security and Africa Studies at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, 2005, No. 1, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr/2005-1/AJCR2005\_pgs33-60\_neethling.pdf, p. 57-58

Be that as it may, it is evident that a range of international reforms throughout the international system has taken place to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours. Much was indeed done to facilitate a fundamental overhaul of the UN system, while major aid agencies established conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. Also, some Western governments aligned their foreign, security and development policies and programmes to respond to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda and challenges of the contemporary international community. This means supporting policies, activities, programmes and projects which facilitate war-prone, war-torn or post-war countries to recover from conflict in order to address longer-term developmental and security goals. All in all, it could be argued that this has led to a better understanding of the political economy of armed conflicts, as well as a drive towards applying appropriate strategies and priorities to deal with developmental and security challenges in responses to violent conflict and civil war. Obviously, this is of great importance from an African perspective given the acute need to apply relevant and constructive measures and strategies in the search for sustainable development and long-term security on the continent.

#### Their nuclear escalation claim is empirically denied by dozens of African conflicts

Tim Docking, African Affairs Specialist with the United States Institute of Peace, 2007, Taking Sides Clashing Views on African Issues, p. 372

Nowhere was the scope and intensity of violence during the 1990s as great as in Africa. While the general trend of armed conflict in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East fell during the 1989-99 period, the 1990s witnessed an increase in the number of conflicts on the African continent. During this period, 16 UN peacekeeping missions were sent to Africa. (Three countries-Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Angola-were visited by multiple missions during this time.) Furthermore, this period saw internal and interstate violence in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states. In 1999 alone, the continent was plagued by 16 armed conflicts, seven of which were wars with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths (Journal of Peace Research, 37:5, 2000, p. 638). In 2000, the situation continued to deteriorate: renewed heavy fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia claimed tens of thousands of lives in the lead-up to a June ceasefire and ultimately the signing of a peace accord in December; continued violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria as well as the outbreak of new violence between Guinea and Liberia, in Zimbabwe, and in the Ivory Coast have brought new hardship and bloodshed to the continent.

### A2 Korean war

#### No war – escalation HIGHLY unlikely – deterrence checks

Rory Medcalf (Program Director - International Security – at the Lowry Institute for International Policy) 4/10/2013 “Korean War II? Maybe, but not likely”, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/04/04/A-new-Korean-war-Maybe-but-not-likely.aspx

I would put the analytical focus on a somewhat different place. Deterrence is alive and well and at home, for better or worse, in the Asian century.¶ Yes, those warning of war have a point. An iconic act of limited aggression by the North is a real possibility. Kim Jong-un obviously feels he has lots to prove, and a fresh act of violence like the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan or the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island might just do the trick. Yes, the South has promised to respond forcefully to any future such provocations, and the US and possibly others would feel compelled to back it up. Yes, the young Kim has thrown fairly much every toy out the cot this time, and needs a face-saving way to quieten down.¶ But I still assess, on balance, that the North Korean leadership is aware of the risks of a spiral into the war, which would seal its fate. Why else, after first promising nuclear attack, has Pyongyang lurched back to rather less apocalyptic threats, such as restarting its Yongbyon reactor or obstructing South Korea workers at a joint project? As for ordinary North Koreans, it's not clear that they think Armageddon is just around the corner.¶ The fate of North Korea is less likely to be about a high-definition replay of the 1950-1953 war than about change from within and eventual regime failure leading to some seriously dangerous moments for US-China diplomacy (as explored in Chapter 5 of this Lowy Institute report). ¶ So for the moment I would play down the war talk. I put a small-scale North Korean attack in the 'possible' basket, an escalation to large-scale conventional conflict in the 'highly unlikely' basket, and the chance of nuclear escalation pretty much as remote as it has been for decades (which is not to say it is impossible).¶ If the Korea crisis of recent weeks underscores one reality it is the central and continuing role of deterrence in Asia's security. It exposes in plain sight – as plain as last week's much-publicised B-2 'stealth' bombing run – the unpleasant fact that the security and prosperity of the Asian century still rests on the existence of American military power and a professed willingness to use it.

#### Now war – at worst miscalc cause small skirmishes but no full scale war

Maplecroft News 4/10/13 “War on Korean Peninsula unlikely, but further escalation could spur capital flight from South – new risk briefing”, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/country-risk-briefings-n-korea-april10.html

An on-going series of provocative measures by North Korea since conducting its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 have escalated tensions in the Korean peninsula and wider North-East Asia region. Maplecroft’s Country Risk Briefing for North Korea makes detailed assessment of Pyongyang's domestic motives and foreign policy consideration behind these actions. In addition to providing general analysis on the dynamics of this isolated and dynastic regime, the briefing also examines regional security implications covering all important stakeholders, such as China, US and Japan. In particular, the briefing looks closely at the potential impact on neighbouring South Korea and its security and business environment.¶ According to the briefing, the risk of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula remains low. However, there is a moderate risk of military miscalculations leading to limited skirmishes, particularly near the maritime border in the East China Sea. The heightened risk of small-scale confrontations will pressure the US, South Korea and Japan to continue to increase their missile defence capabilities. This will be unwelcome to China, despite its own concerns over North Korean behaviour. Beijing will continue to implement UN sanctions more rigidly against North Korea. It will also urge all sides to the conflict to resume six-party talks.

#### No escalation to Korean conflict

David Kang (Professor of International Relations and Business and Director of the Korean Studies Institute –University of Southern California) December 31 2010 “Korea’s New Cold War,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/koreas-new-cold-war-4653)

However, despite dueling artillery barrages and the sinking of a warship, pledges of “enormous retaliation,” in-your-face joint military exercises and urgent calls for talks, the risk of all-out war on the Korean peninsula is less than it has been at any time in the past four decades. North Korea didn’t blink, because it had no intention of actually starting a major war. Rather than signifying a new round of escalating tension between North and South Korea, the events of the past year point to something else—a new cold war between the two sides. In fact, one of my pet peeves is the analogies we use to describe the situation between South and North Korea. We often call the situation a “powder keg” or a “tinderbox,” implying a very unstable situation in which one small spark could lead to a huge explosion. But the evidence actually leads to the opposite conclusion: we have gone sixty years without a major war, despite numerous “sparks” such as the skirmishing and shows of force that occurred over the past month. If one believes the situation is a tinderbox, the only explanation for six decades without a major war is that we have been extraordinarily lucky. I prefer the opposite explanation: deterrence is quite stable because both sides know the costs of a major war, and both sides—rhetoric and muscle-flexing aside—keep smaller incidents in their proper perspective. How can this be, when North Korea threatens to use massive retaliation and mentions its nuclear weapons in its rhetoric, and when the South Korean leadership and military is determined to "respond relentlessly" to meet any North Korean provocation? Local skirmishing has stayed local for sixty years. The key issue is whether a local fight could escalate into all-out war, such as North Korea shelling Seoul with artillery or missiles. Such a decision would clearly have to be taken at the top of the North Korean leadership. Especially when tensions are high, both militaries are on high alert and local commanders particularly careful with their actions. Without a clear directive from the top, it is not likely that a commander one hundred kilometers away from the military exercises would make a decision on his own to start shooting at Seoul. For their part, North Korean leaders have not made such a decision in sixty years, knowing that any major attack on Seoul would cause a massive response from the South Korean and U.S. forces and would carry the war into Pyongyang and beyond. After the fighting, North Korea would cease to exist. Thus, while both North and South Korean leaders talk in grim tones about war, both sides have kept the actual fighting to localized areas, and I have seen no indication that this time the North Korean leadership plans to expand the fighting into a general war.

#### Deterrence Solves

Carlton Meyer (Editor – G2 Military) 2003 The Mythical North Korean Threat, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

#### Deterrence solves escalation.

David Kang (assoc. prof of govt and adjunct assoc prof at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth) Summer 2003 “The Avoidable Crisis in North Korea” *Orbis, Volume 47, Issue 3* accessed via Science Direct

North Korea has not attacked South Korea for fifty years because deterrence works. Despite the tension that has existed on the peninsula, the armistice line has held. Neither side has attempted to mount a major military operation, nor has either side attempted to challenge deterrence on the peninsula.6 Deterrence will continue to hold even if North Korea develops and deploys a nuclear weapon. Deterrence requires both sides to know that the other side can inflict unacceptable costs on it. Since 1953 North Korea has faced both a determined South Korean military, and more important, U.S. military deployments that at their height comprised 100,000 troops and nuclear-tipped Lance missiles and even today include 38,000 troops, nuclear-capable airbases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any conflict on the peninsula. The result has not been surprising: although tension is high, the balance of power has been stable. Far from being an unstable ‘‘powder keg,’’ for five decades both sides have moved cautiously and avoided major military mobilizations that could spiral out of control. The balance of power has held because any war on the peninsula would have disastrous consequences for both sides. The capitals of Seoul and Pyongyang are less than 150 miles apart—closer than New York and Baltimore. Seoul is 30 miles from the demilitarized zone that separates the North and the South (DMZ), and easily within reach of North Korea’s artillery tubes. U.S. General Gary Luck estimates that a war on the Korean peninsula would cost the US$1 trillion in economic damage and result in one million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties. The North, although it has numerically larger armed forces, faces much more highly trained and capable U.S.-South Korean armed forces. With the North growing continually weaker relative to the South, the chances for war become even slimmer. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and it fell further behind early. So the real question has not been whether North Korea would engage in a preventive attack as South Korea caught up, but why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. As the balance of power began to turn against the North, the North deterred the U.S. from attempting to crush it through massive conventional military deployments along the DMZ. Especially because Seoul is both vulnerable to air attack and the center of South Korean life, the South Korean government is quite reluctant to escalate tensions too quickly. North Korea’s military—both conventional and missile systems—exist to deter the South and the U.S. from becoming too adventurous. The peninsular situation is more an uneasy standoff than one of the North’s being in a position to invade the South. Both sides are very careful, and neither wishes to provoke a war, knowing the destruction it would bring.

## Environment ADV

### Environment 1nc

#### No drilling in the squo – all companies have bailed.

Mary O'Grady (is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journa) WSJ – April 24, 2013 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html

Then came promises of an oil boom and last week the predictable bust. The Brazilian state-owned Petrobras PETR4.BR +1.01% had given up on deep-sea drilling in Cuban waters in 2011. Repsol REP.MC -2.46% gave up in May 2012. The deep water platform it was using was then passed to Malaysia's state-owned Petronas, which also came up empty. Venezuela's PdVSA had no luck either. In November Cuba announced that the rig that had been in use would be heading to Asia. Last week came the end of shallow-water drilling.

#### Status quo solves – US inspections of rigs

Padgett 12 (Tim, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms Length Over Spill Prevention”, 1/27, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html)

On Christmas Eve, a massive, Chinese-made maritime oil rig, the Scarabeo 9, arrived at Trinidad and Tobago for inspection. The Spanish oil company Repsol YPF, which keeps regional headquarters in Trinidad, ferried it to the Caribbean to perform deep-ocean drilling off Cuba — whose communist government believes as much as 20 billion barrels of crude may lie near the island's northwest coast. But it wasn't Cuban authorities who came aboard the Scarabeo 9 to give it the once-over: officials from the U.S. Coast Guard and Interior Department did, even though the rig won't be operating in U.S. waters. On any other occasion that might have raised the ire of the Cubans, who consider Washington their imperialista enemy. But the U.S. examination of the Scarabeo 9, which Repsol agreed to and Cuba abided, was part of an unusual choreography of cooperation between the two countries. Their otherwise bitter cold-war feud (they haven't had diplomatic relations since 1961) is best known for a 50-year-long trade embargo and history's scariest nuclear standoff. Now, Cuba's commitment to offshore oil exploration — drilling may start this weekend — raises a specter that haunts both nations: an oil spill in the Florida Straits like the BP calamity that tarred the nearby Gulf of Mexico two years ago and left $40 billion in U.S. damages. The Straits, an equally vital body of water that's home to some of the world's most precious coral reefs, separates Havana and Key West, Florida, by a mere 90 miles. As a result, the U.S. has tacitly loosened its embargo against Cuba to give firms like Repsol easier access to the U.S. equipment they need to help avoid or contain possible spills. "Preventing drilling off Cuba better protects our interests than preparing for [a disaster] does," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida tells TIME, noting the U.S. would prefer to stop the Cuban drilling — but can't. "But the two are not mutually exclusive, and that's why we should aim to do both." Cuba meanwhile has tacitly agreed to ensure that its safety measures meet U.S. standards (not that U.S. standards proved all that golden during the 2010 BP disaster) and is letting unofficial U.S. delegations in to discuss the precautions being taken by Havana and the international oil companies it is contracting. No Cuban official would discuss the matter, but Dan Whittle, senior attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund in New York, who was part of one recent delegation, says the Cubans "seem very motivated to do the right thing."

#### Cuban drilling is safe – access to technology and safety standards prove

Sadowksi 12 (Richard – Managing Editor of Production of the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. X, J.D Candidate at Hofstra University, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo”, 2012, http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp)

Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental threats because of the proximity to the United States and the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba has at least as much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices as does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is taking safety seriously. 64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based International Association of Drilling Contractors, said, “[t]he Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought into what will be required to safely drill,” and that “they are very knowledgeable of international industry practices and have incorporated many of these principles into their safety and regulatory planning and requirements.” 65 Thus, while the economic embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from being uti - lized, foreign sources have provided supplemental alternatives. 66

#### Environment is resilient

Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible**. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, **are** **pinpricks** compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### No extinction

Easterbrook 3 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

### No Drilling 2nc

#### No Cuban drilling now – rigs have departed.

David LaGesse 2012reporter, with recent articles that have appeared in National Geographic, Money, and most frequently in U.S. News & World Report – National Geographic News – November 19, 2012 – http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-cuba-oil-quest/

An unusual high-tech oil-drilling rig that's been at work off the coast of Cuba departed last week, headed for either Africa or Brazil. With it went the island nation's best hope, at least in the short term, for reaping a share of the energy treasure beneath the sea that separates it from its longtime ideological foe.¶ For many Floridians, especially in the Cuban-American community, it was welcome news this month that Cuba had drilled its third unsuccessful well this year and was suspending deepwater oil exploration. (Related Pictures: "Four Offshore Drilling Frontiers") While some feared an oil spill in the Straits of Florida, some 70 miles (113 kilometers) from the U.S. coast, others were concerned that drilling success would extend the reviled reign of the Castros, long-time dictator Fidel and his brother and hand-picked successor, Raúl.

#### Drilling not inevitable over the long-term. No reserves in Cuba.

Mary O'Grady (is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journa) WSJ – April 24, 2013 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html

Remember all the hype about Cuba drilling for oil in Caribbean waters and American companies missing out on the bonanza because of the U.S. embargo? Well, like all the other Cuban get-rich-quick schemes of the past 50 years, this one seems to have flopped too.¶ Last week, Florida's Sun Sentinel reported that "after spending nearly $700 million during a decade, energy companies from around the world have all but abandoned their search for oil in deep waters off the north coast of Cuba near Florida." Separately, CubaStandard.com reported on Friday that "the shallow-water drilling platform used by Russian oil company OAO Zarubezhneft will leave Cuban waters June 1, to be redeployed to Asia."¶ According to the Sun Sentinel story, Jorge Piñon, an oil-industry guru who had been cheering Cuba's exploration attempts, said "Companies are saying, 'We cannot spend any more capital on this high-risk exploration. We'd rather go to Brazil; we'd rather go to Angola; we'd rather go to other places in the world where the technological and geological challenges are less.'"

### Squo Solves 2nc

#### US inspections of Cuban drilling equipment prevents spills – ensures compliance

WSJ 12 (Wall Street Journal, “Cuba - Repsol's Cuba drilling rig complies with safety standards”, 1/10, http://www.bpcplc.com/media-centre/non-company-press-releases/cuba-repsol%27s-cuba-drilling-rig-complies-with-safety-standards.aspx)

U.S. officials said Monday a rig operated by Spain's Repsol YPF that is expected to drill offshore Cuba in the coming months complies with international and U.S. safety standards. 'U.S. personnel found the vessel to generally comply with existing international and U.S. standards by which Repsol has pledged to abide,' the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement said in the press release. The agency, however, noted that the vessel review 'does not confer any form of certification or endorsement under U.S. or international law' and that the U.S. has no legal or regulatory authority over the rig. The vessel, named Scarabeo 9, was inspected off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago and it will begin drilling a deep-water oil well later this year about 100 kms off the Florida Keys. Repsol, which does business in the U.S., had agreed to let U.S. federal regulators inspect the rig before it enters Cuban waters. The rig's review was aimed at minimizing the possibility of a major oil spill, which would hurt U.S. economic and environmental interests, the regulatory agency said. While aboard the Scarabeo 9, U.S. officials reviewed vessel construction, drilling equipment, and safety systems--including lifesaving and firefighting equipment, emergency generators, dynamic positioning systems, machinery spaces, and the blowout preventer, according to agency. In anticipation of increased drilling activities in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, the U.S. is in discussions with the Bahamas, Cuba, Jamaica and Mexico on a broad range of issues, including drilling safety, ocean modeling, and oil spill preparedness and response, in order to reduce the impact of a major pollution incident, the agency said.

#### US standards are met – solves the impact

Geman 12 (Ben, “Interior: Cuba-bound drilling rig ‘generally’ meets US standards”, 1/9, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/203161-interior-cuba-bound-drilling-rig-generally-meets-us-standards)

The deepwater drilling rig that Spanish oil giant Repsol will use for planned oil exploration off Cuba’s coast is getting a clean bill of health from U.S. officials. The United States has no regulatory authority over the drilling, but an Interior Department and Coast Guard team was invited to inspect the Scarabeo 9 rig by Repsol, a check-up that comes as planned drilling off Cuba’s coast draws criticism from several U.S. lawmakers. “The review compared the vessel with applicable international safety and security standards as well as U.S. standards for drilling units operating in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf. U.S. personnel found the vessel to generally comply with existing international and U.S. standards by which Repsol has pledged to abide,” the U.S. agencies said in a joint statement Monday upon completion of the review. The U.S. team reviewed drilling equipment, safety systems such as firefighting equipment and the unit’s blowout preventer and other aspects of the rig. A number of U.S. lawmakers critical of the Cuban government have criticized Repsol’s planned project, noting it will bring revenues to the Cuban regime and that a spill could threaten nearby U.S. shores. More on that here, here and here. “The review is consistent with U.S. efforts to minimize the possibility of a major oil spill, which would hurt U.S. economic and environmental interests,” Interior and the Coast Guard said of the inspection, which occurred off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago.

### Safe Drilling 2nc

#### Cuban and non-US prevention efforts are sufficient now.

Richard Sadowski 2011 (is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp

Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental¶ threats because of the proximity to the United States and¶ the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba¶ has at least as much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices¶ as does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is taking¶ safety seriously.64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based¶ International Association of Drilling Contractors, said, “[t]he¶ Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought¶ into what will be required to safely drill,” and that “they are¶ very knowledgeable of international industry practices and have¶ incorporated many of these principles into their safety and regulatory¶ planning and requirements.”65 Thus, while the economic¶ embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from being utilized,¶ foreign sources have provided supplemental alternatives.66

#### Training and international regulations solve

TC 11 (Television Camaguey, “Cuban Specialists Receive Training on Safe Oil Drilling “, 6/8, http://www.tvcamaguey.co.cu/english/index.php/science-and-technology/35-science/92-cuban-specialists-receive-training-on-safe-oil-drilling-.html)

Cuban specialists who are going to participate in the drilling of deep-water exploratory wells in Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico recently participated in courses on safety and environment protection as part of preparations for such activities. A total of 120 Cubans including executives, officials and technicians of enterprises involved in the oil industry participated in three seminars on the topic taught by Norwegian experts. Manuel Marrero, chief oil and gas specialist of the Basic Industry Ministry, told ACN the several-day training is vital to undertake the deep- and ultra-deep-water drillings scheduled to begin in a few months. Current international regulations for this kind of operations are very rigorous in an effort to protect the environment and avoid accidents such as the one that recently occurred in the British Pretroleum platform.

### Environment Resilient 2nc

#### Environment resilient and improving – their authors lie

Dutton 1 (Dr. Dennis, Professor of Philosophy – University of Canterbury (New Zealand), “Greener Than You Think”, The Washington Post, 10-21, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=& contentId=A12789-2001Oct18)

That the human race faces environmental problems is unquestionable. That environmental experts have regularly tried to scare us out of our wits with doomsday chants is also beyond dispute. In the 1960s overpopulation was going to cause massive worldwide famine around 1980. A decade later we were being told the world would be out of oil by the 1990s. This was an especially chilly prospect, since, as Newsweek reported in 1975, we were in a climatic cooling trend that was going to reduce agricultural outputs for the rest of the century, leading possibly to a new Ice Age. Bjorn Lomborg, a young statistics professor and political scientist at the University of Aarhus in Denmark, knows all about the enduring appeal -- for journalists, politicians and the public -- of environmental doomsday tales, having swallowed more than a few himself. In 1997, Lomborg -- a self-described left-winger and former Greenpeace member -- came across an article in Wired magazine about Julian Simon, a University of Maryland economist. Simon claimed that the "litany" of the Green movement -- its fears about overpopulation, animal species dying by the hour, deforestation -- was **hysterical nonsense**, and that the quality of life on the planet was **radically** **improving**. Lomborg was shocked by this, and he returned to Denmark to set about doing the research that would refute Simon. He and his team of academicians discovered something sobering and cheering: In every one of his claims, Simon was correct. Moreover, Lomborg found on close analysis that the factual foundation on which the environmental doomsayers stood was **deeply flawed**: exaggeration, prevarications, white **lies** and even convenient typographical errors had been absorbed unchallenged into the folklore of environmental disaster scenarios.

### No Extinction 2nc

#### Humans will survive despite biodiversity loss

Sagoff 97 (Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs @ U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N)

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [\*906] The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [\*907] To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for [\*912] the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

### A2 oil spills

#### No impact – ocean current trumps proximity – oil will not reach florida keys – the biological hot spots

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

In assessing the potential threat to U.S. shores, many often reference that Key West, Florida ¶ is a mere 80 miles from the Jaguey prospect site where Repsol drilled in Cuba’s EEZ, north of ¶ Havana, in spring 2012.37 In fact, several other factors—such as the prevailing ocean current, ¶ wind direction and velocity, water temperature, and type of oil spilled — also play critical roles ¶ in determining the direction and speed of spilled oil. Thus, despite the geographic proximity ¶ of the ecologically valuable Florida Keys to the rig site in Cuba, scientists from the National ¶ Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimate that the probability of oil traveling ¶ from a potential blowout at the Repsol rig site to the Florida Keys was comparatively low.38¶ Doug Helton, operations coordinator for the office of response and restoration at NOAA, ¶ emphasized that the dominance of ocean currents can trump distance in influencing the ¶ direction of an oil slick. “The currents are like a conveyor belt at the grocery store,” he told The ¶ Miami Herald.

#### Oil spill predictions are not accurate

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

While areas at risk of immediate impact appear to be those along the Straits of Florida and ¶ U.S. south Atlantic coast, scientists are careful to note that the models are far from precise, ¶ authoritative forecasts. NOAA specialists themselves emphasize that the models vary significantly based on weather data and location of the drilling site. Richard Sears, who served as chief ¶ scientific advisor on the federal commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, ¶ stressed there was significant uncertainty in projecting the path of the BP oil slick in 2010, even ¶ with the combined technical expertise of federal agencies and private companies.42¶ “There were a wide array of models surrounding the BP spill, ranging from most of the ¶ Oil projected to come ashore to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida—to a significant ¶ portion going out through the Straits of Florida and up the East Coast towards North Carolina,” ¶ Sears said in a personal interview. “Neither of those happened.”43¶ Sears described the added complexity of estimating the oil’s vertical movement. “There were ¶ a lot of surprises with Macondo about where the oil went,” Sears explained, “not only in two ¶ dimensions, but also in terms of three dimensional impacts within the water column.”44¶ Preparing for a potential spill in Cuba’s EEZ highlights the underlying uncertainty in ¶ predicting the trajectory of a spill, particularly with regards to possible shoreline impacts ¶ andbiological threats within the water column and on the seafloor. This lack of predictability ¶ reinforces the importance of opening lines of communication and expanding U.S.-Cuban ¶ cooperation to ensure that any containment and response strategy would be implemented ¶ effectively using the most timely incident updates.

### A2 sanctions block US spill assistance

#### Sanctions won’t block US safety response – Helix proves.

Erika Bolstad McClatchy Newspapers – May 10, 2012 – http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.UaoUWpyADq0

Several of the experts said Thursday they are confident that the Treasury Department could react quickly in an emergency to allow U.S. oil response teams to get emergency permits to do business with the Cuban government.¶ The department, which oversees the embargo, has authorized an American firm, Helix Energy Solutions, to handle spill response for Repsol. It’s a red-tape ordeal that company officials said they’ll have to repeat when working with the other companies that have contracted to use the same rig next in Cuban waters.

## China ADV

### China 1nc

#### Multiple alt causes –

#### A) Political views

Hanson and Lee 13 (Stephanie and Brianna – Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, 1/31, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations? A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

#### B) Human Rights, Guantanamo, and Cuban exiles

Hanson and Lee 13 (Stephanie and Brianna – Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, 1/31, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

#### C) The rest of the Embargo – the plan is only a fraction

Hanson 13 (Daniel – economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, “It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba”, 1/16, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/)

While the embargo has been through several legal iterations in the intervening years, the general tenor of the U.S. position toward Cuba is a hardline not-in-my-backyard approach to communism a la the Monroe Doctrine. The official position is outdated, hypocritical, and counterproductive. The Cuban embargo was inaugurated by a Kennedy administration executive order in 1960 as a response to the confiscation of American property in Cuba under the newly installed Castro regime. The current incarnation of the embargo – codified primarily in the Helms-Burton Act – aims at producing free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties.

#### Taiwan-China relations are high

Cole 12 -- Taipei-based journalist who focuses on military issues in Northeast Asia and in the Taiwan Strait (J. Michael, 9/3, "Taiwan Hedges its Bets on China," http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/09/03/taiwan-hedges-its-bets-against-china/)

By a number of yardsticks, relations in the Taiwan Strait today are the best they’ve been in years, if not ever. But if a report released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) on Friday is any indication, Taiwanese government officials don’t appear to be convinced that such détente will last for very long. Without doubt, the pace of normalization in relations between Taiwan and China, especially at the economic level, has accelerated dramatically since Ma Ying-jeou of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was elected in 2008, a process that is expected to continue with Ma securing a second four-year term in January. In addition to the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in June 2010, the governments on both sides have inked at least 16 agreements touching on various aspects of cross-strait relations, including an agreement reached on Friday that will allow banks in Taiwan to clear renminbi transactions, a move that obviates the need for converting the currency into U.S. dollars before a transaction can be made. Beyond trade, visits to Taiwan by Chinese officials have become almost routine, a limited number of Chinese can now study at Taiwan’s universities, Chinese tourism to the island has boomed, and joint exercises by the countries’ respective coast guards are now held every other year since 2010, mostly for the purpose of sea-rescue operations in the waters off Taiwan’s Kinmen and China’s Xiamen.

#### No US-China war – economics

Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)

While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

### Alt Cause – Guantanamo/Human Rights

#### Guantanamo bay sends a contradictory signal – prevents normalization of relations

Vinke 9 (Kira – Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Revamping U.S.-Cuban Politics: Playing the Guantánamo Card in a Game of Constructive Diplomacy”, 2009, http://www.coha.org/revamping-us-cuban-politics-playing-the-guantanamo-card-in-a-game-of-constructive-diplomacy/)

An Investigative Stronghold: A Diplomatic Catastrophe U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba has not only been ineffective, but also contradictory. The supposed purpose of the 47-year-old U.S. embargo on Cuba was to “bring democracy to the Cuban people.” However, the U.S. government itself moved suspects from detention camps like the one in Guantánamo to secret prisons all over the world so as not to be bound by the restraints of a democratic legal system. These actions reveal the inherently duplicitous nature of U.S. policy in this regard. Although President Obama has now signed an order to close Guantánamo within the next year, he has failed to take a “moral high ground” on other American detention centers that have been havens for the U.S. to carry out unlawful, undemocratic practices. For instance, detainees at the Bagram detention center in Afghanistan were recently denied the right to challenge their case before a neutral judge; an outright inconsistency in the U.S.’ so-called restoration of democracy. This makes perfectly clear that effectively reestablishing Washington’s reputation for probity abroad will not end with the closing of the internment camp in Guantánamo. If Obama is serious about undoing U.S. policy in the course of its war on terror, and if he wants to again make this country into a law abiding society, he will have to ensure fair trials for all suspects formerly detained by the U.S. at Guantánamo Bay and then return the military base to Cuba, marking a clear break with its dark history. Such a reconstruction of relations would be beneficial for both partners, economically, politically and socially, especially due to the close geographic proximity of the two nations.

#### Guantanamo and multiple rights violations impede solvency

Sill No Date (Igor – Merton Fellow who earned his Master's Degree from Oxford University, “Viewpoints: Obama, U.S.-Cuban Relations and Guantanamo Bay”, http://www.fpa.org/topics\_info2414/topics\_info\_show.htm?doc\_id=906355)

Guantanamo Bay has resurfaced in the news once again. Once known as a notorious prison for more than 670 US enemy combatants who have been incarcerated, interrogated and some, allegedly tortured over the Bush administration's mandate on the war over global terrorism, its 240 detainees today await relocation as the facility prepares to close operations over the next few months. Beyond the headlines, however, exists a deep history of unresolved issues associated with Guantanamo Bay's U.S. Naval Base, itself merely the tip of a 47 year political iceberg. The idea of conceding the base at Guantanamo Bay back to Cuba, which the U.S. gained control of in the 1903 U.S.-Cuba Pact, has, as of late, gained traction in Latin America and throughout the world. It would certainly standout as an act of generous goodwill by the US, and could potentially result in a range of reciprocal positive actions from Cuba. However, President Obama is very well aware of the many complex issues arising from such a gesture. There are numerous considerations which Cuba would need to address and resolve in return for the U.S. conveyance of Guantanamo Bay's facilities to Cuba. Obama recognizes that Cuba needs to remedy its current policies on human rights. He also realizes that Cuba will need to find a way to adopt an acceptable version of democracy in order to achieve this stature if Cuba is allowed to re-enter the Organization of American States (OAS), which it actively seeks to do. There also remains a range of equally important issues including the release of political prisoners; restitution of outstanding Cuban confiscated property claims by former Cubans now living in the US; restitution of US Corporate interests and properties confiscated by Cuba following the revolution; restitution to the families of Brothers to the Rescue over Cuba's fatal downing of two search planes in February of 1996; and a series of other Cuban governmental misdeeds.

### Alt Cause – Embargo

#### Removing the whole embargo and lifting all travel restrictions is necessary – the plan is insufficient

CCS 9 (Center for Cuban Studies, “The Latest In U.S. and Cuba Relations “, 5/25, http://www.cubaupdate.org/cuba-update/us-cuba/117-the-latest-in-us-and-cuba-relations)

Shortly before the Organization of American States began its summit on the island of Trinidad this past April, the media reported that the Obama administration had undertaken a significant policy shift in regards to relations with Cuba. It is extremely important, however, to recognize that these changes do not mark an end to the nearly fifty year long trade embargo, nor do they signify and end to the travel restrictions that prevent most U.S. citizens from traveling to Cuba legally. What this change essentially does is repeal the most extreme measures that tightened the embargo under the administration of George W. Bush, which limited the amount of remittances that Cubans living in the United States could send to the island, and restricted family visits to once every three years. While this change in policy is certainly a welcome step in the right direction, the truly necessary change would be a move to end the embargo along with travel restrictions for all U.S. citizens, and a normalization of relations between the two countries. The world community’s desire for an end to the U.S. imposed trade embargo has been manifested in the form of several successive United Nations resolutions, each of them overwhelmingly in favor of the U.S. changing its policy toward Cuba. Opinion within the United States has shifted as well. Recently, a CNN/Opinion Research Corp. poll revealed that two thirds of U.S. citizens favor ending the travel ban, and that three quarters favor normalized relations between Cuba and the United States. Many members of Congress have also changed their positions. On March 31, 2009, a bi-partisan group of senators introduced a bill, which, if passed, will end the travel ban, allowing for all U.S. citizens to visit the island. Indiana senator Richard Lugar, ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a sponsor of the bill, has stated that “the unilateral embargo on Cuba has failed to achieve its stated purpose of ‘bringing democracy to the Cuban people.’” U.S. Representative Barbara Lee (D-California), who recently met with both Raúl and Fidel Castro while travelling to Cuba with the Congressional Black Caucus, noted that “we have to remember that every country in Latin America has normal relations with Cuba; we’re the country which is isolated. Despite these positive recent developments, however, there is still resistance to changing Cuba policy within the U.S. government. The opposition from right wing Cuban-American members of congress is predictable, but it is also important to remember that now Vice President Joe Biden voted for the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, and that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated that she imposes lifting the embargo. Hopefully recent developments will help these officials to reverse their previous positions.

### No war – US/China

#### No China conflict – no military use

Aliison & Blackwill 13 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, 1/28/2013, "Beijing Still Prefers Diplomacy Over Force," http://www.cfr.org/china/beijing-still-prefers-diplomacy-over-force/p29892)

As China has become a leading export market for its neighbours, it expects them to be "more respectful", in Mr Lee's words. In public statements, China usually downplays the advantages its size begets, but in a heated moment at a 2010 regional security meeting, its foreign minister had a different message: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact." Mr Lee has a phrase for this message: "Please know your place." Unlike free-market democracies, in which governments are unable or unwilling to squeeze imports of bananas from the Philippines or cars from Japan, China's government can use its economic muscle. As tensions mount over competing claims for contested territories, should we expect Beijing to use military force to advance its claims? From the perspective of the grand strategist, the answer is no – unless it is provoked by others. "China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, and that it needs open sea lanes. They are determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany and Japan," Mr Lee says. In his view, it is highly unlikely that China would choose to confront the US military at this point, since it is still at a clear technological and military disadvantage. This means that, in the near term, it will be more concerned with using diplomacy, not force, in foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, the western statesman who has spent most quality time with Chinese leaders in the past four decades, offers a complementary perspective. As he has written, their approach to the outside world is best understood through the lens of Sun Tzu, the ancient strategist who focused on the psychological weaknesses of the adversary. "China seeks its objectives," Mr Kissinger says, "by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances – only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown." In Mr Lee's view, China is playing a long game driven by a compelling vision. "It is China's intention," Mr Lee says, "to be the greatest power in the world." Success in that quest will require not only sustaining historically unsustainable economic growth rates but also exercising greater caution and subtlety than it has shown recently, in order to avoid an accident or blunder that sparks military conflict over the Senkakus, which would serve no one's interests.

#### -- Chinese leadership will pull back

Ross 1 (Robert S., Professor of Political Science – Boston College, The National Interest, Fall, Lexis

The strategic costs to China of a war with the United States are only part of the deterrence equation. China also possesses vital economic interests in stable relations with the United States. War would end China's quest for modernization by severely constraining its access to U.S. markets, capital and technology, and by requiring China to place its economy on permanent war-time footing. The resultant economic reversal would derail China's quest for "comprehensive national power" and great power status. Serious economic instability would also destabilize China's political system on account of the resulting unemployment in key sectors of the economy and the breakdown of social order. Both would probably impose insurmountable challenges to party leadership. Moreover, defeat in a war with the United States over Taiwan would impose devastating nationalist humiliation on the Chinese Communist Party. In all, the survival of the party **depends on preventing a Sino-American war.**

#### -- History proves no risk of China war – their cards are all hype

Dyer 9 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, “China Unlikely to Engage in Military Confrontation”, Jakarta Post, 4-29,

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/03/12/china-unlikely-engage-military-confrontation.html)

Given America's monopoly or huge technological lead in key areas like stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range sensors, satellite surveillance and even infantry body armor, Goss's warning is misleading and self-serving. China cannot project a serious military force even 200 miles (km) from home, while American forces utterly dominate China's ocean frontiers, many thousands of miles (kilometers) from the United States. But the drumbeat of warnings about China's ""military build-up"" continues. Just the other week U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was worrying again about the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is finally building some amphibious landing ships half a century after Beijing's confrontation with the non-Communist regime on the island of Taiwan began. And Senator Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the European Union ends its embargo on arms sales to China, the U.S. would stop military technology sales to Europe. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the major U.S. defense review planned for this year will concentrate on the rising ""threat"" from China, or that this year for the first time the joint U.S.-Japanese defense policy statement named China as a ""security concern"", or that the Taiwan government urged the ""military encirclement"" of China to prevent any ""foreign adventures"" by Beijing. It comes as no surprise -- but it still makes no sense. China's defense budget this year is 247.7 billion yuan: Around US$30 billion at the official exchange rate. There are those in Washington who will say that it's more like $60 billion in purchasing power, but then there used to be ""experts"" who annually produced hugely inflated and frightening estimates of the Soviet defense budget. Such people will always exist: to justify a big U.S. defense budget, you need a big threat. It's true that 247.7 billion yuan buys an awful lot of warm bodies in military uniform in the low-wage Chinese economy, but it doesn't actually buy much more in the way of high-tech military systems. It's also true that the Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years: This year it's up by 12.6 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing, and it's about what you have to spend in order to convert what used to be a glorified peasant militia into a modern military force. It would be astonishing if China chose NOT to modernize its armed forces as the rest of the economy modernizes, and the end result is not going to be a military machine that towers above all others. If you project the current growth rates of military spending in China and the United States into the future, China's defense budget catches up with the United States about the same time that its Gross Domestic Product does, in the late 2030s or the early 2040s. As to China's strategic intentions, the record of the past is reassuring in several respects. China has almost never been militarily expansionist beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle Kingdom (which do include Tibet in the view of most Chinese), and its border clashes with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the first decades of Communist rule generally ended with a voluntary Chinese withdrawal from the disputed territories. The same moderation has usually applied in nuclear matters. The CIA frets that China could have a hundred nuclear missiles targeted on the United States by 2015, but that is actually evidence of China's great restraint. The first Chinese nuclear weapons test was forty years ago, and by now China could have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on the U.S. if it wanted. (The United States DOES have thousands of nuclear warheads that can strike Chinese targets.) The Beijing regime is obsessed with economic stability, because it fears that a severe downturn would trigger social and political upheaval. The last thing it wants is a military confrontation with its biggest trading partner, the United States. It will go on playing the nationalist card over Taiwan to curry domestic political favor, but there is no massive military build-up and no plausible threat of impending war in East Asia.

#### -- US/China war will be limited – no escalation

Record 1 (Dr. Jeffrey, Professor of Strategy and International Security – Air War College and Senior Research Fellow – Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy, “Thinking About China and War”, Aerospace Power Journal, 12-6, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html>)

Assuming the absence of mindless escalation to a general nuclear exchange, a war between China and the United States would be **constrained** by **limited military capacity** and **political objectives**. For openers, neither China nor the United States is capable of invading and subjugating the other, and even if the United States had the ability to do so, avoidance of a land war on the Asian mainland has long been an injunction of American strategy. The objectives of a Sino-American war over Taiwan or freedom of navigation in the South China Sea would be limited—just as they were in the Sino-American war in Korea. And since the outcome in either case would be decided by naval and air forces, with regular ground forces relegated to a distinctly secondary role, a war over Taiwan or the South China Sea would also be limited in terms of the type of force employed. This was not the case in the Korean War, in which ground combat dominated. (To be sure, the US position on the ground would have been untenable without air dominance.)

### No war – US/China – economics check

#### Economics places multiple checks on conflict

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’. Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the United States and China. Involvement in the globalization process has rapidly expanded China's involvement in international organizations in ever-growing fields,36 within many of which China accepts West-led international norms.37 The country has thus shifted from ‘opposing the international order’ to ‘reforming the international order’ to ‘maintaining the international order’.38 Globalization has changed not only China's but also United States’ behavioral principles. The growth of Sino–US economic interdependence has prompted the United States’ adoption of a two-pronged policy of military and political containment and of economic engagement. Its aim is to reduce the risk of a head-on conflict that could considerably damage United States’ interests. These contradictory strands of US policy towards China are an indicator of superficial friendship. Under the context of economic globalization, China has also developed economic interdependence with United States’ allies. This has reduced incentives to participate in containment of China and also dampened United States’ resolve to maintain a policy of complete containment. As a result, certain scholars argue that enhanced levels of interdependence among China and other nations have diminished the probability of China's opting to rise through forceful expansion.39

### No war – China/Taiwan – relations resilient

#### Cross-strait relations better than ever – no conflict

Paal 12 -- vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Douglas, 6/12, "Taiwan: Outlook for Cross-Strait Relations," http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/12/taiwan-outlook-for-cross-strait-relations/bkih)

With the inauguration of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou for his second and final four-year term in May, cross-strait relations appear more stable than they have been in more than sixty years. That does not mean, however, that observers should expect further big steps to improve relations between Taipei and Beijing. We are entering an era of limited aspirations and restrained expectations. On the home front, by contrast, Ma announced in his inaugural address an ambitious reform program that is already encountering some stiff resistance. Ma repeated his campaign promise calling for a “golden decade” built on five pillars of reform: economic transformation, creating employment and realizing social justice, green energy, invigorating culture, and development of Taiwan’s most important resource, its human talent. In cross-strait relations, the outlook is only for incremental improvements. Taiwan expects to expand its preferential trade arrangements with the mainland, establish representative offices on the mainland and Taiwan to manage relations, complete an investment protection agreement, expand educational opportunities in both directions, and advance cooperation against crime. Despite their limited scope, these will be politically sensitive and tricky to implement without triggering negative reactions.

## Russia ADV

### No war

#### No Russia impact

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

#### No impact

David E. Hoffman 10/22/12, contributing editor to Foreign Policy and the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, which won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction, "Hey, Big Spender," Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/hey\_big\_spender?page=full

Despite tensions that flare up, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies; the chance of nuclear war or surprise attack is nearly zero. We trade in each other's equity markets. Russia has the largest audience of Facebook users in Europe, and is open to the world in a way the Soviet Union never was.

#### Cold war calculations no longer apply – neither side would consider war

Cartwright et al 12 [Gen (Ret) James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Amb. Richard Burt, former ambassador to Germany and chief negotiator of START; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering, former ambassador to the UN; Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO and Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command; GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUcLEAR POLicy cOMMiSSiON REPORT, http://orepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cartwright-report.pdf]

These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there remains a physical-technical side of MAD in our relations, but it is increasingly peripheral. Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear conflict between our countries, driven largely by inertia and vested interests left over from the Cold War, functions on the margins using outdated scenarios that are implausible today. There is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side. Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 nuclear weapons each in their active deployed and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is needed to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively.

### No war – US/Russia – no escalation

#### No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely **remain limited and compartmentalized**. Russia and the West **do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over**. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

### No war – US/Russia – no nukes

#### No nuclear strike

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

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### No expansion

#### No Russia expansionism.

Ottens 11 [Nick Ottens, editor of the transatlantic news and commentary site the Atlantic Sentinel and contributing analyst for the geostrategic consultancy Wikistrat, “The Myth of Russia’s Resurgence,” August 20 2011, http://atlanticsentinel.com/2011/08/the-myth-of-russias-resurgence/]

Wikistrat‘s Thomas Barnett reminds readers of Russian fears of encirclement in his latest World Politics Review column. After shrugging off its empire in 1991, Russia was denied a “sense of belonging,” Barnett notes, when Europe and the United States refused to consider Russia’s entry to NATO. Instead, America moved in militarily from the south as part of its global War on Terror while China progressively encroached, in an economic sense, on Russia’s “near abroad” in Central Asia and the Far East.¶ Russia has been remarkably reluctant to counter these infringements. Although nearly all former Warsaw Pact members belong to the European Union now, it has made only halfhearted attempts to regain a semblance of hegemony on its western border. Old Eastern Bloc nations may still worry about Russian antagonism, especially if Germany, which is so dependent on Russian gas imports, won’t truly protect them in the EU (which is why they expect security from the United States in NATO)—the likelihood of Moscow deploying force against Poland, Lithuania or even the Ukraine is close to zero.¶ In other parts of its former empire, too, Russia is far from belligerent. Although vying for influence there with nearby greater powers, Russia has refrained from policing Central Asia in Soviet style despite the alluring natural resources that the region possesses. When Kyrgyzstan asked for a Russian troop presence last year to quell political unrest, the Kremlin balked at the request. It had no desire to become entangled in the internal power struggles of its former client state.¶ Russian cultural and political influence pervades especially in the northernmost of former socialist republics in Central Asia but Chinese, Iranian and Turkish attempts at fostering stable relations in the area could set the stage for a greater power confrontation, one from which Moscow stands nothing to gain.¶ Russian governors in the Far East occasionally raise the specter of the “yellow menace” and talk of the danger posed to their underpopulated provinces by unregulated Chinese labor migrants but as Dmitry Gorenburg pointed out here last year, “this kind of talk rarely emanates from Moscow and certainly does not affect troop positioning.”¶ Indeed, “it is stunning how little trouble Moscow has fomented” since the demise of the Soviet Union, writes Barnett, “all while engineering arguably the greatest military demobilization in human history, going from more than two hundred army divisions to less than one hundred brigades.”

**Or there’s no escalation.**

**Weitz 11** (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

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#### No aggression – cooperation inevitable.

Sawczak 11 [Dr. Peter Sawczak, Adjunct Research Fellow at Monash University, “Obama’s Russia Policy: The Wages and Pitfalls of the Reset,” peer reviewed paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Feb 3-4 2011, <http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf>]

As a measure of their optimism, US officials like to point – cautiously – to a discernible shift in Russian foreign policy towards a more pragmatic, cooperative approach. Whether or not the Obama administration can claim credit for this, the United States has at least shown Russia the dividends which could flow from enhanced cooperation. This is most palpably reflected in the Russian foreign policy paper leaked in May 2010, which identifies a “need to strengthen relations of mutual interdependence with the leading world powers, such as the European Union and the US,” 5 as well as, more indirectly, in Medvedev’s modernisation agenda. The fact that Russia has sought, in the tragic circumstances attending commemoration ceremonies at Katyn, rapprochement with Poland and moved to demarcate its border with Norway, in addition to partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests to US policy-makers that a rethink, however tenuous, is underway. Noteworthy also is the fact that Russia, gladdened by the emergence of more compliant leaders in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has been remarkably restrained of late in its dealings closer to home, not having waged any major gas wars, threatened leaders, or incited civil war.

## Add-Ons

### A2 Obama Credibility

#### Single instances of action do not change international perceptions of the United States.

Fettweis, 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

#### Alt Caus – Guantanamo Bay

Katulis, 9 (Brian, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and the Obama Administration”, A Century Foundation Report, http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb681/Katulis.pdf)

Actions speak louder than words. In addition to changing how it talks about democracy and freedom, the United States must take tangible steps to regain its credibility in a process that one analyst calls “decontamination” from the negative practices associated with the Bush administration’s approach. 10 To reshape perceptions in the Middle East, the United States—including not only the Obama administration, but also members of Congress and representatives of the justice system—should find a solution to the policy question of thousands of detainees and prisoners under U.S. military control in Iraq; it should also continue its work in closing the Guantanamo detention camp and secret prison facilities run by the CIA, as well as abandon the practice of remanding terror suspects to countries with poor human rights records. The detention of tens of thousands of individuals, many of whom are from the Middle East, outside a transparent international framework for the rule of law reduces American credibility on democratic reform and opens it up to charges of hypocrisy, with critics of U.S. policy pointing out human rights and rule of law abuses justified in the name of fighting the war on terror. As a matter of values and principles, the United States should work with other countries to develop a sustainable and viable justice system that deals with these detainees. More broadly, the United States should take steps to restore habeas corpus and bring wiretap surveillance efforts back into the framework of the rule of law in the United States. Sending the signal that the United States is cleaning up its act on these fronts is a necessary step for reviving U.S. credibility on democracy promotion in the Middle East. Without some progress on these measures, anything else that the new administration tries to do on democracy promotion—whether it is political party building or civil society support, or any of the other traditional programs in the U.S. toolbox—will likely yield few results because of the substantial credibility gap. The new administration needs to send a clear message that the United States intends to practice what it preaches by adhering to the legal obligations it assumed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and other human rights treaties. Strengthening the legal framework for rule of law will require not only action on the part of the Obama administration but also engagement by leaders in the U.S. Congress. How the United States reintroduces itself to the world—keeping its national security policy in line with the highest human rights standards—will set the framework for how U.S. actions on the democracy promotion front are perceived throughout the Middle East. In addition to taking these steps to restore America’s image and credibility in the region, the new administration should look to enhance existing partnerships and build new ones. Given views about the United States in the Middle East, rather than go it alone, Washington should seek to develop joint efforts with other countries working to advance democracy in the Middle East, such as members of the European Union and Japan, and with multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank. The United States is not the only outside actor working to advance decent governance and democracy in the Middle East, and developing more strongly coordinated approaches to advancing democracy in the region will be necessary to meet the daunting challenges. Limited partnerships and coordination already exist on some fronts, particularly between some U.S. and European nongovernmental organizations, but expanding these collaborative efforts will help reframe perceptions of U.S. efforts to advance democracy in the Middle East.

#### No impact to credibility – allies won’t abandon us and adversaries can’t exploit it

Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem)

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.